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Measuring  bank efficiency  is difficult  because  there  is no satis-
factory definition of bank output. International  comparisons
based  on operating  costs  and  margins  are  fraught  with  problems.
These stem from substantial  differences  in capital structure
(leverage),  business  or product  mix, range and quality of ser-
vices, inflation  rates, and accounting  conventions  (especially
about  the  valuation  of assets,  the level  of loan  loss provisioning,
and  the  use  of hidden  reserves).  Facile  and  uncritical  use  of ratios
cannot substitute  for detailed  knowledge  and understanding  of
banking  structure  and practice.
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Measuring bank efficiency is difficult because  combines two simple identilies between profit-
there is no satisfactory definition of bank output.  ability ratios, bank leverage, and gross margins.
Neither the number of accounts nor total assets,  It copes quite well with the differential impact of
total loans, and total deposits provide a good  capital structure, product mix, and inflation but
index of output.  Moreover, the value added of  not with differences in accounting conventions.
banks - given by their labor costs and profits-  ROE analysis can also shed light on the relation-
measures both the output and the cost of bank-  ship between spreads, leverage, and inflation.
ing.
Vittas applies his analysis to the perKor-
Many analysts use accounting data on bank}  mance of banks in OECD countries in the 1980s.
margins, costs, and profits as measures of bank  He shows that U.K. building societies, Cermnan
efficiency.  But the usefulness of these data is  savings banks, and commercial banks in Canada,
undermined by substantial structural and ac-  Germany, and the Netherlands were highly
counting differences across countries, among  profitable and efficient.  American money center
individual banks, and over time.  Great caution  banks anI  foreign banks in Canada were the least
and extensive knowledge of local banking  profitable.
conditions are required to interpret bank ratios.
The data also suggest that banks in consoli-
Vittas uses three sets of operating ratios to  dated banking systems with high concentration,
discuss the impact of differences in structure and  as in Canada, the Netherlands, and Sweden, have
practice on bank performance:  lower operating costs than banks in fragmented
syst,ms, as in Italy, Norway, and the United
* Operating asset ratios (which relate all  States.
revenues and costs to average assets).
The analysis has major implications for
* Operating income ratios (which relate  assessing bank performance in developing
revenues and costs to gross income).  countries. Given the narrower range and lower
quality of their services and the lower level of
* Operating equity ratios (which relate  wages, their cost-asset and cost-income ratios
revenues and costs to average equity).  should be smaller than for banks in developed
countries.  But inflation, higher risk, and operat-
He also uses return-on-equity (ROE) analy-  ing inefficiencies often cause cost and other bank
sis to highlight the effects of differences in  ratios to be generally higher than in OECD
banking structure and practice.  ROE analysis  countries.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
A major plank of programs of banking and financial reform In developing countries is
the Improvement in bank efficiency that may result from exposing domestic institutions
and markets to greater competition.  A basic benefit of enhanced  efficiency is a reduction
in spreads  between lending and deposit rates.  This is likely to stimulate both greater loan
demand  for industrlal investment (and thus contribute to higher economic growth) and
greater mobilization  of financial savings through the banking system.
Banks  in developing countries operate with relatively wide spreads. These are
caused  by government  policies and regulations  and by operating Inefficiencies.  For
Instance, a wedge between loan and deposit rates, at least for the nonprivileged customers
of banks, is created by the imposition of onerous reserve requirements  and other forms of
bank taxation, the operation of directed credit programs and a high level of Inflation.  In
addition, high operating costs, large loan losses and large profits from uncompetitive
behavior are also translated into wide bank spreads.
An issue that confronts policymakers of developing countries is how to measure
imorovements  in bank efficiency.  One way is to collect detailed data on bank spreads
before and after the reform.  Another Is to undertake a detailed comparative study of
spreads  In different countries.  Both of these approaches  are quite laborious, because
banks offer a wide range of loans and deposits as well as other types of services. A
careful identification of bank products and services and a compilation of detailed data on
Interest rates and other fees would be required, while the findings may still be inconclusive
if spreads  for specific products exhibit variations from country to country that have no
systematic pattern.
An alternative approach is to use some aggregate  index of bank efficiency.
However, constructing such an aggregate index is subject to great difficulties.  The most
basic problem  is the lack of a satisfactory definition of bank output.  Most econometric
studies of banking (for instance, in the extensive literature on bank economies of scale and
scope) use either total assets, loans or deposits or the number of accounts as an index of
bank output even though none of these variables  is able to capture the value of service
provided by banks.
A better alternative is perhaps  a measure  of the value added of banks, which Is given
by the labor costs and profits of banks. However, value added also measures  the total
cost of banking. While it may give a better indication of the size of the banking industry
than either the number of loan accounts or the value of loan balances  outstanding, it does
not provide  a satisfactory measure  of bank efficiency.  Value added may be as high for
1banking  systems  that provide  a wide range  of services  at low cost as for banking  systems
that offer a narrow range  at high cost.
To obtain  a good  measure  of bank  efficiency  it would be necessary  to construct  an
independent  Index  of bank  output  or at least  an index  of bank  prices  that could  then be
used  to obtain  a measure  of bank  output. Such  a measure  could  then be combined  with
data  on bank  costs  to ascertain  the relative  efficiency  of different banking  systems  or
Individual  banKo.
Unfortunately.  such  independent  measures  of Lank  prices  and output  are not
generally  available.  Moreover,  even  if they were  available,  an important  policy  Issue  would
still remain  unresolved.  It would still be possible  for one  banking  system  to offer a narrow
range  of services  at low unit cost and  for another  to offer a wider range  of services  at
higher  unit cost.  While  the latter might  be less  efficient in terms of unit costs, its total
economic  contribution  could  be higher  than  the former  system  if the provision  of a wider
range  of services  reduced  the transaction  and  information  costs  of other  economic  agents
and  led  to a more  efficient mobilization  and  allocation  of resources  by the economy  as a
whole.
Faced  with these  difficulties,  most  analysts  resort  to the use of accounting  data  on
bank  margins,  costs  and profits  as measures  of bank  efficiency. Three  types  of operating
ratios  may be used  in analyzing  the performance  of banks:  operating  asset  ratios,
operating  income  ratios and  operating  equity  ratios. The first relate  all revenues  and  costs
to average  total assets,  the second  to gross  income  and  the third to average  equity.
Although  they are more  readily  available  and  widely used,  the usefulness  of
operating  ratios  is undermined  by differences  in capital  structure,  business  mix, and
accounting  practices  across  countries,  among  individual  banks,  and  over  time. Operating
ratios  are also  affected  by variations  in inflation  rates.
Differences  In capital  structure  refer  to differences  in the equity  capitalization  ratio of
different  banks,  i.e. the ratio of average  equity  capital  to average  total assets: banks  with
a higher  equity  will genere'lv  report  higher  operating  ratios,  such  as interest  and  gross
Income  margins  and  return  -.- issets (ROA)  and  lower  costlincome  ratios,  than banks  with
a lower  equity,  even  thoug'  ie basic  interest  spreads  of the two banks  may  be the
same.
Differences  in business  mix derive  from differing  combinations  of high  and low
margin  business,  while accounting  practices  that distort operating  ratios  cover  such  Issues
as the valuation  of assets,  the treatment  of reserves  for depreciation,  pensions.  and  loan
losses,  and  the use of hidden  reserves.  The  impact  of Inflation  also  varies  depending  on
the capital  structure,  business  mix and  accounting  conventions  of banks  In different
countries.
The remainder  of this paper  is devoted  to a critical examination  of traditional
measures  of bank  efficiency  such  as bank  margins,  costs  and  profits. A fundamental  point
of the paper  Is that Interpreting  and  using  data  on bank  margins,  costs  and profits requires
great  caution  and detailed  knowledge  of the operating  characteristics  of different banks.
2The  paper  also emphasizes  the fact that different  ratiou .ave their merits  and
demerits  and  that a combination  of ratios  from  each  type may  provide  a better,  though  still
not fully satisfactory,  indication  of efficiency. Particular  emphasis  is placed  on ROE  (return
on equity)  analysis  that underscores  the links  between  different profitability  ratios,
leverage  and  product  mix. ROE  analysis  can also  be used  to shed  light on the relationship
between  bank  spreads,  leverage  and  inflation.
The  next section  of the paper  provides  an analytical  discussion  of the factors  that
Influence  bank  margins,  while the third section  reviews  the experience  of banking  systems
in some  OECD  countries. The paper  conc:udes  with a discussion  of some  analytical  and
policy  issues.
311.  DElERMINANTS F OPERATING  RATIOS
2.1  Operating  Ratios  of Styized OECD  Bank
Table  I  shows  the operating  ratios  of a stylized  bank  that would broadly  correspond
t.  the average  bank  in OECD  countries. Bank  A has a loan  portfol  that represents  60*6
of Its total assets. It also  invests  25% of assets  In securities  and  Interbank  claims  that
yield money  market  rates. The remaining  15% of assets  are non-interest-earning,  5% In
fixed assets  and  trade  investments  that may  appreciate  in nominal  or real  value  terms  and
10% in assets  that have  a fixed nominal  value. On  the liabilities  side, Bank  A is assumed
to have  15% of !labilltles  in demand  deposits  and  other  Items  that pay no Interest,  60% in
interest-bearing  depcsits,  20% in borrowed  funds that pay money  market  rates,  and 5% In
equity. The spread  between  loan  and  deposit  rates  is 4%.  The  rates  of interest  on various
instruments  are as indicated  in Table  1. The rates  implicitly  assume  an infiation  rate of
5%.  Noninterest  Income  amounts  to 0.75% of assets  and  noninterest  expenses  (including
both operating  costs and  provisions)  to 2.6% of assets.
Table 1
stylized Bank oferating Ratios
Bank 
Assets  Liabilities
loans  60  11%  Demand deposits  10  0%
securities  15  9%  Other deposits  60  7%
Interbank  10  9%  Borrowed funds  20  9%
Fised assets  5  0%  Other liabilities  5  0%
other assets  10  0%  Equity  5  0%
Total  100  8.85%  Total  100  6.00
O2oratino Ratios
OAR  OIR  OER
l3terest margin  2.85  79.2  57.0
Noninterest income  o  07  20.8  15. 
Gross  income  3.60  100.0  72.0
Noninterest expenses  2.60  72 2  52.0
Not  income  1.00  27.8  20.0
On  the basis  of these  assumptions,  Bank  A has  the following  operating  asset  ratios
(OAR):  an Interest  margin  of 2.85%, a gross  income  margin  of 3.6% and  a ROA  of 1%.
(It should  be noted  that the interest  spread  of 4% is reduced  to an average  Interest  margin
of 2.85%). Its operating  income  ratios  (OIR)  show  that Bank  A generates  20.8% of its
gross  income  through  non-interest  fees,  while its cost/income  ratio is 72.2%.  The
operating  equity ratios  (OER)  show  a ROE  of 20%.  But they also  show a gross  Income  to
equity ratio  of 72% and a cost to equity  ratio of 52%. These  last two ratios  provide  an
Indication  of the extent  to which Bank  A may be over-  or under-trading  by comparison  to
other banks.
4The ROE  of 20% is, of course, expressed  In nominal terms.  Allowing for Inflation,
this would fall to 15%. although a correct calcul  ation of the ROE  under inflation should
also take account of the revaluation gains of fixed assets and trade investments.
Prevailing  accounting practice does not Include revaluation gains in annual profit
calculations, though this may be very misleading  not only in countries suffering from high
Inflation but also in countries with low but persistent inflation.
The study of biank  performance  and efficiency would present law  difficulties if all
banks had the samo capital structure, offered the same mix of services, followed identical
accounting practices, were equally affected by inflation and operated under the same
regulatory restrictions.  Under these circumstances, a simple comparison of Interest
margins, cost ratios and rates nf return would provide a clear indication of relative
efficiency even in the absence  of a satisfactory deJinition  of bank output.
However, banks exhibit considerable  differences in their capital structure, their
business  mix and their accounting practices. Banks  also operate in substantially different
macroeconomic  and regulatory environments. These differences have a large impact un
their operating ratios and east serious  doubt on the usefulness  of facile comparisons based
on ROAs, interest and gross income margins, and cost/income ratios.  Moreover. the
accounting Jata,  on which all types of  operating ratios are based, suffer from many
qualitative problems that seriously undermine  the usefulness  of these ratios for analytical
and policy purposes.
2.2  Cardtai  Structure
Most financial analysts focus on the return to assets (ROA)  ratio as a mes3ure  of
bank efficiency without paying adequate attention to the impact of differences in the
equity capitalization ratio of different banks.
A bank with a higher equity capital will report a higher ROA than a bank with a lower
equity capital, even if all other spreads  and costs are the same. Table 2 shows the impact
of capital structure on various operating ratios.  It assumes  two banks that have identical
asset and liability structures as well as noninterest Incomes  and expenses  as Bank A,
except for their equity capital and borrowed funds.
Bank B has an equity capital of 7.5% and reports a higher ROA of 1.22% but a
lower ROE  of 16.2%.  In contrast, Bank C has an equity capital of 2.5% and reports a
lower ROA of 0.77%  but a higher ROE  of 30.8%.
In general,  and as already  noted above, a higher equity capital Increases  most
operating asset ratios, such as the interest margin, gross income margin and ROA, but
lowers operating income ratios (such as the share of noninterest income and the
cost/income ratio) and operating equity ratios.  The reason  for this is very simple.  A bank
with a higher equity capital needs to borrow less in order to support a given level of
assets. As a result Its interest expenses  are lower and this causes the interest margin to
be higher.  This is then reflected in a higher gross income to assets ratio.  If costs and
provisions are unaffected by the higher level of equity, the result is a higher net income
5Mablo 2
The  Imoact  of  Caoital  StruMtjUQ
Righ Equity  Capital  - Low  Leverage
Asutat  Liabilitios
Loans  60  11%  Damand  deposits  10  0%
Securities  1S  9%  Other deposits  60  T
Interbank  claims  10  9%  Borrowed  funds  17.5  9%
Fixed a5uets  5  0%  Other  liabilities  5  0O
Other assets  IQ  0  Equity  705  0%
Total  100  8.85%  Total  100  5.78%
Onoratino Ratios
OAR  OIR  Qfl
Interest  sargin  3.07  80.4  40.9
Noninterest  income  07  19 6  100
Gross  Lncome  3.82  100.0  50.9
Nonintereat expenses  2 6  68.1  3.Ll
met income  1.22  31.9  16.3
Low  Equity  Capital  - High  Leverage
Assets  Liabilities
Loans  60  11%  Demand deposits  10  0%
Securities  15  9%  Other deposits  60  7%
Interbank claims  10  9%  Borrowed funds  22.5  9%
Fixed  assets  5  0%  Other liabilities  5  0%
Other assets  10  0%  Equity  2  0%
Total  100  8.85%  Total  100  6.23%
operating  Ratios
Interest margin  2.62  77.7  104.8
Noninterest income  0.75  22A3  30.0
gross income  3.37  100.0  134.8
Noninterest expenses  I  2162  104.0
Net income  0.77  22.8  30.8
6and lower cost/income ratios.  Its operating equity ratios are lower because  it has a higher
equity base. In Table 2, Bank B shows a lower ROE  as well as lower gross Income and
costs to equity ratios, implying that it is urdertrading compared to both Bank A and Bank
C.
These ratios result from the assumption  that bank spreads  and operating costs.
including loss provisions, are the same  for all three banks, irrespective of their different
capital structures.  They reflect the well known advantages of higher leverage,  although
they disregard  the greater r?sks  normally associated  with higher leverage. In principle,
however, one would expect a bank with a lower capital to be more risky and therefore to
be faced with a higher cost of funds.  But irrespective of whether or not the cost of funds
adjusts for the higher risk of more leveraged  banks, the fact remains  that for Bank B to
have the same ROE  as Bank A it would need  to operate with much higher spreads and
margins.  In the example of Table 2, Bank B would need a ROA of 1.5% in order to earn a  E
ROE  of 20%.  This would imply an interest margin of 3.35  (instead of 2.85%) and a gross
Income  margin of 4.1% (instead of 3.6%).  Conversely,  Bank  C could operate with a ROA
of only 0.5% and still earn a 20% ROE. This would imply an interest margin of 2.35%
and a gross income margin of 3.1%.
Data for different types of American banks show that their equity capitalization
ratios range from 4.6%  for the money center banks to 8.2% for small local banks. Also,
data for commercial banks in different OECD  countries show that equity capitalization
ratios varied on average  over the 1980-86 period from 7.9% for Spanish  banks and 7.1%
for Finnish banks to as low as 1.4% for Swedish banks and 2.4%  for French  and
Japanese  banks. Thus, differences in the equity capital of banks can be substantial and
need to be borne in mind in analyzing  the performance  of banks across countries or even
within a given country.
2.3  Business  or Product Mix
The second  factor that can influence bank ratios are differences in business  or
product mix.  Table 3 provides  an illustration of two banks with substantial differences In
business  mix.  The example  assumes  three types of loans and two types of interest-
bearing deposits.  Bank D has a greater involvement in retail banking which is associated
with higher loan rates, lower deposit rates and higher operating costs.  Bank E specializes
in wholesale  corporate banking. Both banks are assumed  to generate  the same amount of
fee Income and to have the same  capital structure.
The example  of Table 3 is constructed in a way that illustrates that two  banks can
have the same  ROAs and ROEs,  even though their interest margins, gross income margins
and operating cost ratios are widely different.  Any conclusion that the bank with lower
margins  and cost ratios (Bank E) is more efficient would be totally unwarranted.  In fact,
by assumption, both banks charge the same  rates of interest on loans to the same  types
of customers and also pay the same rates on similar deposits.
Many analysts looking at the low margins  either of Japanese  banks or of the UK
building societies postulate that these institutions are more efficient than the large
7Table  3
The  impact  of Business  Mix
Bank  D
Retail  Product  Mix  - High  margins
Assets  Liabilities
Retail  Loans  20  14%  Demand  deposits  10  0%
Small  business  20  12%  Retail  deposits  40  4%
Large  corporate  20  10%  Wholesale  deposits  30  8%
Securities  15  9%  Borrowed  funds  10  9%
Interbank claims  10  9%  Other liabilities  5  0%
Fixed  assets  5  0%  Equity  5  0%
Other  assets  10  0%
Total  100  9.45%  Total  100  4.90%
gverating Ratios
OAR  OER
interest margin  4.55  85.8  91.0
Noninterest income  0.75  _14.2  15.o
Gross  income  5.30  100.0  106.0
Noninterest expenses  4.30  81.1  1  86.0
Net income  1.00  18.9  20.0
LUtk E
Wholesale  Product  Mix  - Low Margins
Assets  Liabilities
Loans  60  10%  Demand deposits  5  0%
Securities  15  9%  Other deposits  65  8%
Interbank  claims  10  9%  Borrowed funds  20  9%
Fixed assets  5  0%  Other  liabilities  5  0%
Other assets  10  0%  Equity  5  0%
Total  100  8.25%  Total  100  7.00%
fteratinao  Ratios
OAR  OIR  ER
Interest  margin  1.25  62.5  25.0
Noninterest income  0.75  37.5  15.0
gross  income  2.00  100.0  40.0
Noninterest  expenses  1.00  50.0  20.0
Net income  1.00  50.0  20.0
8American and British commercial banks that generally  exhibit much higher operating
margins.  But this disregards  the fact that high margin business  involves high operating
costs - for Instance smaller  loar.A  are more expensive to process and monitor, while smaller
deposits require  X jlgger  branch network to collect and sewice.
Moreover, banks that offer a wider range  of services, Including payment products
and investment banking services, will have much higher operating costS than banks that
confine themselves to specialized  areas of deposit and lending business. But banks
offering a wider range of services also have a greater opportunity to generate  noninterest
fees.  Investment and merchan banks have traditionally relied on noninterest fees for tI..;r
services in trade and corporate financs, including mergers and acquisitions. The advent of
securitization In recent years has also contributed to an increase  in fee income.
Securitization represents  a new direction in product mix that may explain, at least
partly, she upward trend in interest and gross income margins and operating cost ratios of
American commercial  banks. A bank that securitires the loans it originates will post a big
increase  in both its noninterest fee and operating cost ratios compared  to a bank that
retains its loans and inctludes  the interest spread  in its interest margin.  To the extent that
business  is non-asset  based, operating ratios will be higher without necessarily implying
lower efficiency.
A further way in which differences in business  mix may affect operating ratios is
through differences in interest mismatch.  Banks  that extend fixed rate term loans on the
basis of short-term deposits assume  a greater interest rate exposure than banks that
specialize  in short-term credits funded with short-term deposits or those that fund fixed
rate term loans with fixed rate term deposits. Thus, even if they operate with similar
spreads, banks with a greater interest mismatch will generally show lower margins when
interest rates are rising and higher margins  when interest rates are falling than banks with
a smaller or no mismatch'.
2.4  Range  and Quality of Services
An important consideration  in assessing  bank efficiency is the range and quality of
services offered tn both corporate and individual customers. Banks  that offer a limited
range of services, operate a small number of branches, do not use computerized facilities
and rely on labor-intensive  and slow processing methods will tend to have low operating
costs.  However, despite their low operating cost ratios, it does not require much
'  This assumes  that mismatched  banks  have mors interest-sensitive deposits  than loans.
If the reverse occurs, i.e. if banks have  more interest-sensitive  loans than deposits, then their
margins  will be lower when interest are  falling and higher  when they are rising. This was the
case for the large UK clearing banks in the 1  970s and early 1  980s when they were funding
variable-rate  loans with non-interest bearing (and therefore fixed-;ate) deposits. The advent
of  interest-bearing demand deposits in the  late  1980s has put  an end to  this  kind of
mismatch.
9Imagination to see  that their efficiency leaves much to be desired. In effect, such banks
transfer the operating costs of banking to their customers.
A recent World Bank mission to Romania  highlighted the low quality of service
offered by the Romanian  savings bank. The savings bank has 26 million accounts which
are mostly handled manually and/or mechanically  rather than by computerized systems.
Because  of this, int6rest rates are changed at very Infrequent intervals.  This labor-
intensive system of record keeping causes  long delays in transaction processing  with long
and slow moving lines.  Provisional  data included In the report show that the operating
costs of the Romanian  savings bank were less than 0.17% of Its total assets (World Bank,
1  990b).
In contrast, banks that offer a wide range of services, operate large branch networks
and Invest heavily in computer facilities and ecotronic processing In order to enhance  the
quality of their services will tend to incur larger costs and will thus report higher operating
cost ratios than banks with a limited range and low quality of services.
Thus, differences in the range  and quality of service must be borne in mind in
comparing the performance  of banks and other deposit institutions, especially when
comparing banks from developed  and developing countries.  As a rule, banks In developing
countries offer a much narrower range of generally lower quality services.  Given their
lower labor costs one would expect bank-  operating costs to be lower In developing
countries.  the  fact that banks in very few developing countries have operating costs that
are lower than those of banks in most developed  countries suggests that developing
country banks suffer from operating inefficiencies such as overstaffing and uneconomic
branching".
2.5  The Impact of Inflation
Apart from capital structure and business  mix, differences in accounting practices
can have a big impact on operating ratios.  Four aspects of accounting difference will be
discussed  in this paper: the treatment and Impact of inflation, the valuation of assets and
liabilities, the level of provisioning and th  e use of hidden reserves.
The impact of Inflation is a very complex issue that depends  on the treatment of
revaluat;on  gains on the fixed assets and trade investments of banks as well as on
changes  In business  mix caused by the response  of economic agents to inflation.  The
2  Many economists  argue  that developing  countries suffer from bank overbranching. The
evidence produced for such claims is not, however, very convincing since branch densities
In developing countries are usually a fraction of those found In developed countries.  But
banks may suffer from  uneconomic branching even if  overall branch densities are low.
Uneconomic  branching implies  that banks  are  forced to operate  unprofitable branches  and are
not  allowed to  change their  interest rates and service charges to  enhance the  overall
profitability of their branch networks or to close down uneconomic branches.
10Tabl  4
The  Imnact  of  Inflation
Bank  F
No  "Free  Equityo  - Inflation  Gains
Assets  Liakilitio
Loans  60  26%  Demand  deposits  10  0%
securities  15  24%  Other  deposits  60  22%
Zaterbank  10  24%  Borrowed  funds  20  24%
Fixed  assets  5  0%  Other  liabilities  5  0%
other  assets  1Q  0%  Equity  5  0%
Total  100  21.6%  Total  100  18.0%
92erAting  Ratios
OAR  Q]_  OOR
Interest  margin  3.60  82.8  72.0
Noninterest  income  0.75  17j  2.LLQ
Gross  income  4.35  100.0  87.0
Noninterest supenses  2.60  iS  80
Net  income  1.75  40.2  35.0
Revaluation  gains  la-OR  23.0  2L
Total  income  and  gains  2.75  63.2  55.0
Monetary  correction  1  00  23.0  20LQ
Adjusted  not  income  1.75  40.2  35.0
So  *Free  Equity  - Inflation  Losses
Anseas  hiabilit-es
Loans  60  26%  Demand  deposits  5  0%
Securities  15  24%  Other  deposits  65  22%
Interbank  10  24%  Borrowed  funds  20  24%
Fixed  assets  5  0%  Other  liabilities  5  0S
Other  assets  10  0%  Equity  50S
Total  100  21.6%  Total  100  19.1%
Operating  Ratios
OAR Q
interest  margin  2.50  76.9  50.0
Noninterest  income  025  23.1  15.0
Gross  income  3.25  100.0  65.0
Noninterest  expenses  2.  0  0  2 0
Net  income  0.65  20.0  13.0
Revaluation  gains  1.00  30.8  am
Total  income  and  gains  1.65  50.8  33.0
Monetary correction  1.00  30.8  20.0
Adjusted  not  income  0.65  20.0  13.0
11latter depends on the extent to which interest rates and other bank charges adjust to
Inflation.
Banks  would generally benefit from inflation if they have demand  deposits that pay
zero interest, provided customers are slow in switching into interest-bearing  instruments.
On the other hand, banks would lose from inflation to the extent that they have "free
equity", I.e. to the extent that their equity capital exceeds  their fixed assets and trade
Investments and is therefore invested in loans.  "Free equity" is sometimes called
"financial capital" or "net monetary working capital".
As already  noted, the data in Table 1 for Bank A are broadly based  on the average
bank in the average  OECD  country and assume an inflation rate of 5%.  Bank  A has
noninterest liabilities, including equity, equal to 20%, while its noninterest earning assets
are equal to 15%.  Because  its equity is equal to its fixed assets, Bank A has no "free
equity" and as long as the value of fixed assets increases  with inflation and the structure
of its assets and liabilities does not change, its real ROE  will be equal to its nominal ROE  of
20%.  This is because  the revaluation gains on its fixed assets would not allow an erosion
of the real value of its equity.
But a bank c;ould  still benefit from inflation if its noninterest-bearing  liabilities exceed
its noninterest-earning  assets. Table 4 shows the balance sheet structure and operating
ratios of Bank F, which is assumed  to operate in a country with a 20% rate of Inflation.  It
can be seen that its interest and gross margins are significantly higher than for Bank A and
Its reported ROA and ROE  are 1.75% and 35% respectively.  Because  it Is assumed  that It
has no "free equity", these are also its real ROA and ROE.
The results of Bank F depend crucially on the assumption  that its structure of assets
and liabilities has not changed even though inflation accelerates  from 5% to 20%.
However, under high inflation, bank customers will try to economize  on their noninterest-
bearing demand  deposits and switch their funds to other types of deposits, while banks
may start offering cash management  and money market accounts.  In countries, with no
interest rate controls, banks may also start paying interest on demand  deposits at a
reasonable  spread below time and savings deposits.  If one assumes  that half of demand
deposits are transferred to time deposits, then banks would lose substantially from
inflation.  The lower half of Table 4 shows Bank G with a less favorable deposit structure.
Its ROA falls to 0.65%  and its ROE  to 13%.
Inflation may cause an increased use of banking services if customers make more
frequent bank visits to transfer funds across different accounts.  This would cause a rise in
operating costs that banks would try to recoup by levying transaction fees.  But inflation
can have an even bigger  impact on operating ratios and bank profitability if it Involves
asset disintermediation  and demonetization. Under such circumstances, banks would
suffer a loss of deposit and loan business  but continue, for a while at least, to operate
large branch networks and staff.  Their equity capitalization ratios would increase  because
their financial assets and liabilities would decline in real terms but their fixed assets would
maintain their real value.  The impact on operating ratios would depend on the net effect
of Inflation on their business  mix, capital structure and noninterest revenues  and expenses.
12The impact of Inflation would also be greater if banks have 'free  equity", the value
of which Is not hedged against inflation.  Thus, in the examples  of Table 4, if banks F and
O have fixed assets equivalent to 2.5% of total assets, then the gains from revaluing fixed
assets would add only 50 basis points to income. The real ROA, profit rstio and ROE  of
Bank  F would fall to  1.25%, 2F 7% and 25% respectively, while those of Bank G iw  '1-
fall to 0.15%, 4.6% and 3%.  liius,  the combination of inflation losses from changes in
product mix with the erosion of the value of 'free  equity" can have a devastating effect o.1
operating ratios and bank profitability.
2.6  Asset Valuation
There are many problems  with the valuation of assets that affect banks In all
countries.  For instance, the use of book rather than market values for instruments that are
readily traded, such as government securities, can distont  trading incentives that may give
rise to misleading  operating results. Thus, banks with weak capital and profitability would
have an incentive to retain all securities  that suffer a capital loss and sell all those that
show a significant capital gain.  By including the gains in their income statement, even as
a nonrecurrent item, they would Increase  their equity capital.  In this way, both bank
profitability and equity capital may be artificially boosted while the quality of assets on the
balance sheet may deteriorate3.
The above policy of overstating profits and bank capital would be followed In
countries where banks are under regulatory pressure  to boost their capital ratios.  In
contrast, in cases where bank capital is strong, banks may follow the opposite policy of
selling depreciating  securities to reduce their tax liabilities, while keeping appreciating ones
in their balance sheets as a source of hidden strength.
Another way in which accounting policies may affect the true financial position of
banks is through the undervaluation  of assets due to a failure to adjust asset values to
their replacement  cost.  This approach  would also tend to reduce depreciation charges and
would thus result in an overstatement of profits and an understatement  of capital, so that
profit ratios (ROEs)  may be overstated on two counts.
On the other hand, accounting systems that allow banks to report depreciation and
other reserves (for loan losses, pensions, etc) as liabilities rather than as asset offsets will
tend to overstate total assets. The impact on operating asset ratios will then depend on
the nature of the reserves  that are reported as other liabilities.  If the reserves mainly cover
depreciation  provisions, then both other assets and other liabilities will be overstated and
operating asset ratios will be reduced. Especially,  interest and gross income margins as
well as operating cost ratios will be lower.  However, operating income and equity ratios
will be unaffected.
3  It is argued that this practice has been extensively used by thrift  Institutions in the
United States in the 1  980s (see  White, 1990).  In Germany, banks are generally required to
report securities at the lower of cost or market price, although they also have the right under
some  circumstances to report securities at cost (Deutsche  Bundesbank,  1990).
13Continental  European  banks  tend also  to report  pension  reserves  and reserves  for
loan  losses  on their balance  sheet. The  impact  of these reserves  Is quite  different from
that of depreciation  reserves.  Pension  reserves  represent  equitylike funds that can be.
and  are, invested  In interest-earning  assets. The  impact  of pension  reserves  will be  to
increase  the Interest  and gross income  margins  as well as reported  ROAs,  though other
operating  ratios  are unlikely  to be affected.
The  Impact  of reserves  for loan  losses  depends  on whether  they represent  general  or
specific  provisions.  General  provisions  have  the same  effect as pension  reserves  since
they Imply  no reduction  in interest  Income. But  specific  provisions  should  Involve  a
suspension  of Interest  accrual  so that their effect would be more  like that of depreciation
reserves.
The  ImDact ol Asset Valuation Rules
Bank B
overstatement  of  Other  Assets  and  Other  Liabilities
Amo  ta  Liabilitie
Loans  52.2  11%  Demand  deposits  8.7  0%
securities  13.1  9%  Other deposits  52.2  7t
interbank  8.7  9%  Borrowed funds  17.4  9%
Fixed assets  4.3  0%  Other  liabilities  17.4  0%
Other assets  21.7  0%  Equity  4  0%
Total  100.0  7.69%  Total  100.0  5.22%
Oneratina Ratios  OQR  J
Interest margin  2.47  79.2  57.4
Noninterest income  0 65  iL  it"
Gross income  3.12  100.0  72.5
Noninterest expenses  2.26  72.4  52.5
Net income  0.86  27.6  20.0
Table  5 shows  the case  of a bank  that overstates  both  its other assets  and  other
liabilities. The  asset  and  liability  structure  as well as spreads  and  costs  are the same  as
for Bank  A, except  that Bank  H is assumed  to have  an additional  15% of total assets  in
other  liabilities  and  other  assets. Equity  falls to 4.3% and  all other assets  and liabilities  are
adjusted  accordingly.  Bank  H reports  lower  operating  asset  ratios  but Its operating  income
and  equity  ratios  are  identical  to those  of Bank  A (minor  discrepancies  are due  to
rounding).  Banks  In continental  Europe  tend  to report reserves  for depreciation  as liabilities
on their balance  sheet  and  this may partly  explain  their generally  lower operating  asset
ratios.
142.7  LonuProvnin
The treatment of provisions affects the balance sheet totals of banks, but the level
of provisioning impacts their reported profitability.  Failure  to suspend  the accrual of
Interest on nonperforming loans will overstate interest revenues  and the interest margin of
banks, while failure to provide adequately  for future loan losses will understate total
noninterest expenses. Loan classification and provisioning are based on an assessment  of
the ability of borrowers to service their loans and are clearly subjective exercises.
However, banks that fail to make adequate provisions, even when their customers are In
financial distress and loan servicing is doubtful, overstate their profits as well as their
equity capital and total assets.
Although the impact of inadequate  provisioning on bank operating ratios Is not in
doubt, Its Importance in comparing ratios of different banks, especially  across countries, Is
rather unclear. This is because  provisioning is a subjective exercise and the need  for
provisions can be hidden by informal rollovers and by companies borrowing from one bank
to repay a maturing loan to another.  In general, banks that report very low levels of loss
provisions are more likely than not to understate  their provisions and overstate their
profits.
Another problem with provisions Is that banks in some countries include their loss
provisions with other operating costs.  This creates  comparability problems  that can be
overcome  only by considering  total noninterest expenses  together.
2.8  Hidden Reserve
An Issue that is closely related to provisioning policies is the use of hidden
reserves 4. The problem with hidden reserves is not Inadequate  provisioning as such, but
rather the hidden nature of the provisions. The impact of hidden reserves  on bank
profitability and reported operating ratios depends on whether hidden reserves are used to
smooth out annual fluctuations in bank profits or whether they are also used to build a
hidden base of bank capital.
If hidden reserves are only used for smoothing purposes,  their Impact on income and
cost ratios will cancel out over longer periods, although they would hide fluctuations in
annual profits and might make more difficult the detection of changes  in trends.  But If
they are used for building a hidden source of capital, then estimates of bank profits must
be increased by the rise in hidden reserves over a particular period and bank equity capital
by the total volume of hidden reserves.
If a bank maintains its hidden reserves  at a constant fraction of its reported equity,
the return on reported equity and the total return on its true equity will be the same. The
4  Banks in  some  European countries,  and  especially Germany, the  Netherlands,
Switzerland and Luxembourg, are allowed by their supervisory authorities to  use hidden
reserves  as general contingencies against fluctuations in loan losses and profits.
istrue ROE  will be higher  than the reported ROE  only If hidden reserves increase  relative to
reported equity.  On the other hand, the true ROA of banks with hidden reserves will be
higher than the reported ROA, because  such banks will have a higher level of both true
profits and true equity.
Table 6 shows the balance  sheet and operating ratios of Bank  1, which has exactly
the same  asset and liability structure as well as spreads  and costs as Bank  A, except that
20% of Its equity is hidden. Hidden reserves  represent 25% of its reported equity and are
Included with other liabilities. The illustration assumes  that hidden reserves are created by
overstating expenses  by 0.20% of assets and thus increasing hidden reserves by 0.20%
which is the same as the return on both reported and true equity.  It can be seen that
although the interest and gross margins are unchanged,  the ROA is lower at 0.80%
compared  to  1  % for Bank A.  The true ROA would, of course, be I % if account Is taken
of the overstatement of expenses. Also, the reported cost income ratio is higher since
operating costs are overstated while revenues  are unchanged.
Table  6
The  Impact  of Hidden  Reserves
Bank  I
Hidden  Reserves  a Constant  Fraction  of Reported  Bquity
Assets  Liabilities
Loans  60  11%  Demand  deposits  10  0%
Securities  1S  9%  Other  deposits  60  7%
Interbank  10  9%  Borrowed  funds  20  9%
Fixed  assets  5  0%  Other  liabilities  6  0%
Other  assets  10  0%  Equity  4  0%
Total  100  8.85%  Total  100  6.0
Operating  Ratios  OAR  OIR  OER
Interest  margin  2.85  79.2  71.3
Noninterest  income  0.75  20.8  18.7
Gross  income  3.60  100.0  90.0
Noninterest  expenses  2.80  77.8  70.0
Net  income  0.80  22.2  20.0
This example shows how hidden reserves  affect ROAs but not ROEs  if the hidden
reserves do not change as a fraction of reported equity.  It should, however, be noted that
the interest and gross margins would be different if the hidden reserves  are created by
understating revenues.
2.9  ROE  Analvsis
It should be abundantly clear by now that bank operating ratios are affected by
differences in capital structure, business  mix and accounting conventions. The effects of
16many of these differences can only be assessed  by detailed knowledge of the structure
and practices of different financial systems. There are no easy shortcuts.  However, there
Is one approach which highlights the effect of some of these differences. This is known
as the ROE  analysis and is based on a combination of two simple identities.  First, the ROE
Is equal to the product of the ROA and bank leverago (i.e. the inverse of the equity
capitalization ratio); and second, the ROA Is equal to the product of the gross income
margin (gross income as a proportion of total assets) and the profit ratio (net Income as a
proportion of gross income).
Table 7 shows the ROE  analysis  for the stylized banks used in the preceding
discussion. It should be remembered  that by assumption the banks discussed  in the
different examples  operate with the same spreads  between loan and deposit rates for
similar lines of business. Their operating costs are also the same, except for banks D and
E where the assumed operating costs reflect the high and low margin nature of their
business  respectively. The reported operating cost ratios are also different for banks H
and I but only because  of the effect of accounting practices: in one case, they are lower
because  of the overstatement of assets, while in the other they are higher because
expenses  are overstated by the annual transfers to hidden reserves.
Table  7
ROE Analvsis
Profit  Gross  ROA  Lever  ROE
Ratio  Margin
Bank A  27.8  3.60  1.00  20.0  20.0
Bank B (high equity)  31.9  3.82  1.22  13.3  16.3
Bank C (low equity)  22.8  3.37  0.77  40.0  30.8
Bank D (high  margin)  18.9  5.30  1.00  20.0  20.0
Bank E (low  margin)  50.0  2.00  1.00  20.0  20.0
Bank F (inflation  winner)  40.2  4.35  1.75  20.0  35.0
Bank G (inflation loser)  20.0  3.25  0.65  20.0  13.0
Bank H (overstated assets)  27.6  3.12  0.86  23.3  20.0
Bank I (hidden reserves)  22.2  3.60  0.80  25.0  20.0
Table 7 shows clearly that banks with a high equity capital (and low leverage)  have
higher profit ratios, gross margins and ROAs. However, their ROEs  are lower, although
this may partly reflect their lower riskiness. The table also shows that high and low
margin banks may have very different operating ratios and still be equally profitable and
efficient.  The table further highlights the potential distorting impact on bank ratios of
inflation as well as of asset valuation and other accounting practices.
172.10  SMads.  Leveras  ad  latio
A question that is of particular concern in countries with high inflation regards  the
impact of Inflation on average  spreads. The question is whether ROAs in the region of 3%
to 5% (or higher) and gross margins of 7% to 10% (or higher) can be explained  by the
level of Inflation.  The ROE  analysis  can be used to shed light on this issue.
For any bank, the first identity used in ROE  analysis states that the real ROE "r" Is
equal to its leverage "g" times its real ROA 'a".  or in algebraic terms,
r  =  g  *  a
Similarly, the nominal rate of return on equity "n"  is equal to its leverage times the
nominal return on assets "b"
n=  g  *  b
With inflation 'p",  the nominal return on equity is also equal to
n  = {(0 +0  r)  (1 + p)} -1I
so that the nominal return on assets "b" may also be given by
b =  (1 +r)  *  1 +o))  - 1
When inflation is zero, "b"  equals "a".  The last equation shows that the required
nominal ROA, representing  the average  spread or margin on all assets after the deduction
of all costs, depends  on the targeted real ROE,  the level of Inflation and the degree of
leverage. A targeted real ROE  of 10% would require  a nominal ROA of 0.50%  with zero
inflation and leverage of 20, but the required nominal ROA would rise to 0.78% with  5%
Inflation, to 1.05% with 10% inflation and 2.15% with inflation of 30%.  With a leverage
of 10 instead of 20, the corresponding  required nominal ROAs would be twice as high and
with a leverage of only 5, they would be four times as high.
The second identity used in ROE  analysis  stipulates that the nominal ROA "b" is
equal  to the product of the nominal gross income margin  im" and the proflt ratio 'q'.




m =  {(1 +r)  *  1 +W)} - 1
g  q
18The  profit ratio  is equal  to (1-c), where  "c" is the cost/income  ratio  based  on total
costs  including  all types  of provisions.  Thus,  a high  cost bank  will have  a low profit ratio
and  vice  versa. A bank  with a profit ratio  of 20% would need  a gross income  margin  that
Is 5 times  its nominal  ROA,  but a bank  with a 50% profit ratio would require  a gross
margin  of only twice its ROA. The  profit ratio reflects  the product  mix and  range  and
quality  of services  offered  by a bank  but It also  depends  on its operating  efficiency. Table
8 shows  that a combination  of high  inflation,  low geverage  and high/cost  operations  may
require  a very high  gross  Income  margin  in order  to achieve  a targeted  real  ROE  of 10%.
Before  concluding  the general  discussion  of the determinants  of bank  operatirig  ratios
It Is worth stressing  two points. First,  the equity capitalization  ratio used  In this analysis
differs  from  the risk-based  capital  ratio used  under  the Basle  agreement.  In the latter, the
denominator  Is not total assets  but risk-weighted  assets,  although  off-balance  sheet  items
are  also  Included,  while  the numerator  may  also cover  non-equity-type  capital,  such  as
subordinated  debt.
Second,  the ROE  analysis  shows  the strong  Interrelationship  between  different
operating  ratios. For  instance,  a bank  with an equity  capitalization  ratio  of 6% and a
target  ROE  of 20% would need  to earn  a ROA  of 1.2%. If such  a bank  also  has  a target
profit ratio of 40% (i.e. a cost/income  ratio  of 60%), then  It can achieve  its targets  with a
gross  income  margin  of 3%.  However,  a bank  may  achieve  the same  ROE  and ROA  with
a higher  gross margin  and  a lower profit ratio. Thus,  a hank  with a gross  margin  of 5%
would need  a profit ratio  of only 24%.  Such  a bank  could  operate  equally  profitably  with a
cost/income  ratio  of 76%.
19TABLE  8
SPREADS,  LEVERAGE  AND  INFLATION
REQUIRED  NOMINAL  ROA  FOR  TARGETED  REAL  ROE  OF  52  REQUIRED  GROSS  INCOME  MARGIN
TARGETED  REAL  ROE  OF 102  AND  PROFIT  RATIO  OF  20X
LEVERAGE  LEVERAGE
INFLATION  5  10  15  20  25  40  INFLATION  5  10  15  20  25  40
0X  1.00  0.50  0.33  0.25  0.20  0.13  0X  10.00  5.00  3.33  2.50  2.00  1.25
5X  2.05  1.03  0.68  0.51  0.41  0.26  5X  15.50  7.75  5.17  3.88  3.10  1.94
10X  3.10  1.55  1.03  0.78  0.62  0.39  102  21.00  1C.50  7.00  5.25  4.20  2.63
152  4.15  2.08  1.38  1.04  0.83  0.52  152  26.50  13.25  8.83  6.63  5.30  3.31
202  5.20  2.60  1.73  1.30  1.04  0.65  202  32.00  16.00  10.67  8.00  6.40  4.00
302  7.30  3.65  2.43  1.83  1.46  0.91  302  43.00  21.50  14.33  10.75  8.60  5.38
502  11.50  5.75  3.83  2.88  2.30  1.44  502  65.00  32.50  21.67  16.25  13.iO  8.13
1002  22.00  11.00  7.33  5.50  4.40  2.75  1002  120.00  60.00  40.00  30.00  24.00  15.00
REQUIRED  NOMINAL  ROA  FOR  TARGETED  REAL  ROE  OF 10X  REQUIRED  GROSS  INCOME  MARGIN
TARGETED  REAL  ROE  OF 102 AND  PROFIT  RATIO  OF  302
LEVERAGE  LEVERAGE
o  INFLATION  5  10  15  20  25  40  INFLATION  5  10  15  20  25  40
02  2.00  1.00  0.67  0.50  0.40  0.25  02  6.67  3.33  2.22  1.67  1.33  0.83
5X  3.10  1.55  1.03  0.78  0.62  0.39  52  10.33  5.17  3.44  2.58  2.07  1.29
10X  4.20  2.10  1.40  1.05  0.84  0.53  102  14.00  7.00  4.67  3.50  2.80  1.75
15X  5.30  2.65  1.77  1.33  1.06  0.66  152  17.67  8.83  5.89  4.42  3.53  2.21
202  6.40  3.20  2.13  1.60  1.28  G.80  20X  21.33  10.67  7.11  5.33  4.27  2.67
302  8.60  4.30  2.87  2.15  1.72  1.08  302  28.67  14.33  9.56  7.17  5.73  3.58
502  13.00  6.50  4.33  3.25  2.60  1.63  50%  43.33  21.67  14.44  10.83  8.67  5.42
1002  24,00  12.00  8.00  6.00  4.80  3.00  1002  80.00  40.00  26.67  20.00  16.00  10.J0
REQUIRED  NOMINAL  ROA  FOR  TARGETED  REAt  ROE  OF 152  REQUIRED  GROSS  INCOME  tATGIN
TARGETED  REAL  ROE  OF  102 AND  PROFIT  RATIO  OF  502
LEVERAGE  LEVERAGE
INFLATION  5  10  15  20  25  40  INFLATION  5  10  15  20  25  40
02  3.00  1.50  1.00  0.75  0.60  0.38  02  4.00  2.00  1.31  1.00  0.80  0.50
52  4.15  2.08  1.38  1.04  0.83  0.52  52  6.20  3.10  2.07  1.55  1.24  0.78
102  5.30  2.65  1.77  1.33  1.06  0.66  102  8.40  4.20  2.80  2.10  1.68  1.05
152  6.45  3.23  2.15  1.61  1.29  0.81  152  10.60  5.30  3.53  2.65  2.12  1.33
20X  7.60  3.80  2.53  1.90  1.52  0.95  202  12.80  6.40  4.27  3.20  2.56  1.60
30X  9.90  4.95  3.30  2.48  1.98  1.24  302  17.20  8.60  5.73  4.30  3.44  2.125
SO2  14.50  7.25  4.83  3.63  2.90  1.81  50X  26.00  13.00  8.67  6.50  5.20  3.25
1002  26.00  13.00  8.67  6.50  5.20  3.25  1002  48.00  24.00  16.00  12.00  9.60  6.00Ill.  THE EXPERIENCE  OF BANKS  IN SELECTED  OECD  COUNTRIES
The operating performance  of banks in some OECD  countries is summarized  in
Tables 9 to 14.  Tables 9, 11 and 13 cover all commercial  banks in 16 countries over the
period 1980-86, while Tables 10, 12 and 14 cover various types of banks in 6 countries
over the period 1985-89.  Tables 9 and 10 show operating asset ratios, Tables 1  1 and 12
operating income ratios and Tables 13 and 14 operating equity ratios.
3.1  Qegratina Asset Ratios
Operating  asset ratios relate bank revenues  and expenses  to average  total assets.
The main usefulness  of operating asset ratios is that they are directly comparable  to the
rates of Interest applied on loans and deposits.  But operating asset ratios suffer from
many weaknesses. Their usefulness  is seriously  undermined  by differences in capital
structure, business  mix, and accounting practices across countries, among individual banks
and over time.  Moreover, operating asset ratios tend to place an undue emphasis  on
banks as financial intermediaries  and holders of assets rather than as providers of financial
services.
Over the 1980-86 period the highest gross income margin was registered by
commercial  banks in the UK with 4.93%, followed by Spanish, Norwegian, Italian and
American banks, all of which had gross margins  in excess of 4% (Table 9).  Finnish banks
also were very close to this group with a gross margin of 3.92%.
At the other end of the scale, the lowest gross margins were shown by banks in
Japan and Luxembourg  (less  than 2%) and Switzerland and Belgium  (less  than 3%).
Banks  in Portugal, Canada,  Germany, Sweden, France  and the Netherlands  had gross
margins  between 3% and 3.5%.
The banks with the highest gross margins generally  also had the highest interest
margins and total operating costs.  Similarly, the banks with the lowest gross margins
reported the lowest interest margins and total operating costs.  The close correlation
between gross margins  and total operating costs suggests that some banks specialize  in
high margin/high  cost business  while others focus on low margin/low cost business.
Banks  in Japan and Luxembourg  were involved to a greater extent than other
commercial  banks in interbank and other wholesale banking, where both interest spreads
and operating costs were low and where the opportunities for generating noninterest fees
were limited.  The last point Is highlighted by the low level of noninterest Income for banks
from these countries.  In contrast, although Swiss banks also engaged  in low margin
business,  they were able to generate  significant fee income and thus their gross margin
was much higher than that of banks in either Japan or Luxembourg. The fee income of
Swiss banks mainly derives from their substantial  fiduciary business.
Apart from Swiss banks, banks in Finland  also posted a high :evel of noninterest
Income. Two possible explanations  could be advanced  for this.  Finnish banks may have
resorted to charging their customers  fees for various services in order to compensate for
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OPERATING  ASSET  RATIOS
percent  of  average  total  assets
CCNERCIAL BAKS,  AVERAGE  1980-86
Nan-  Pre-tax  After-tax
Interest  Interest  Gross  Operat.  Provis.  Total  Net  Taxes  Net
Nargin  Income  Income  Costs  Costs  Income  Income
Belgitu  1.71  0.47  2.18  1.80  0.01  1.81  0.37  0.15  0.22
Canada (1982-86)  2.57  0.76  3.33  2.05  0.57  2.62  0.71  0.18  0.53
Fintand  1.84  .08  3.92  3.04  0.36  3.40  0.52  0.15  0.37
France  2.69  0.48  3.17  2.15  0.63  2.78  0.39  0.17  0.22
Gereny  2.37  0.93  3.30  2.14  0.54  2.68  0.62  0.34  0.28
Italy  (1980-85)  3.21  1.21  4.42  2.90  0.76  3.66  0.76  0.42  0.34
Japan  1.42  0.28  1.70  1.19  0.03  1.22  0.48  0.25  0.23
Luxembourg  1.07  0.25  1.32  0.40  0.61  1.01  0.31  0.16  0.15
Vetherlands  2.28  0.74  3.02  1.95  0.58  2.53  0.49
Norway  3.25  1.43  4.68  3.26  0.72  3.98  0.70  0.13  0.57
Portugal  2.37  1.05  3.42  2.11  0.83  2.94  0.48  0.06  0.42
Spain  3.90  0.83  4.73  3.14  0.89  4.03  0.70  0.19  0.51
Sweden (1981-86)  2.20  1.02  3.22  1.97  0.78  2.75  0.47  0.24  0.23
Switzerland  1.34  1.18  2.52  1.40  0.43  1.83  0.69  0.20  0.49
United  Kingdom  3.33  1.60  4.93  3.40  0.52  3.92  1.01  0.36  0.65
Uinted  States  3.22  1.11  4.33  2.95  0.49  3.44  0.89  0.21  0.68TABLE  10
OPERATING  ASSET  RATIOS
percent  of  average  total  assets
AVER.GE  1985-89
Non-  Pre-tax  After-tax
Interest  Interest  Gross  Operat. Provis. Total  Net  Taxes  Net
Margin  Income  Income  Costs  Costs  Income  Income
UNITED  STATES
All  Commercial  Banks  3.39  1.52  4.91  3.28  0.84  4.12  0.79  0.23  0.56
Small banks  4.05  0.84  4.89  3.35  0.65  4.00  0.89  0.18  0.71
Mediun  banks  3.73  1.33  5.06  3.46  0.67  4.13  0.93  0.20  0.73
Money  centre  banks  2.46  2.12  4.5R  3.11  1.12  4.23  0.35  0.19  0.16
Other  large  banks  3.27  1.57  4.84  3.20  0.93  4.13  0.71  0.15  0.56
GERMANY
All  commercial banks  2.21  0.73  2.94  2.11  0.13  2.24  0.70  0.38  0.32
Big  comwercial  banks  2.60  0.98  3.58  2.58  0.11  2.69  0.89  0.49  0.40
Savings  banks  3.05  0.33  3.38  2.15  0.43  2.58  0.80  0.53  0.27
Credit  cooperatives  3.07  0.39  3.46  2.73  0.07  2.80  0.66  0.45  0.21
Giro  landesbanks  0.78  0.10  0.88  0.48  0.17  0.65  0.23  0.15  0.08
UNITED  KINGDOM
LO  Large  comnercial  banks  3.21  1.71  4.92  3.27  0.81  4.08  0.84  0.34  0.50
Building  societies  2.04  0.36  2.40  1.15  0.00  1.1q  1.25  0.45  0.80
SPAIN  (1986-89)
Commercial  banks  4.02  0.99  5.01  3.19  0.63  3.82  1.19
Savings  banks  5.00  0.69  5.69  4.28  0.36  4.64  1.05
CANADA  (1984-88)
Domestic  banks  2.78  0.97  3.75  2.20  0.65  2.85  0.91  0.30  0.60
Foreign  banks  1.73  0.72  2.45  1.52  0.34  1.86  0.59  0.30  0.29
NETHERLANDS
Commercial  banks  2.02  0.74  2.76  1.82  0.23  2.05  0.71
Savings banks  3.12  0.29  3.41  2.36  0.04  2.40  1.01their low interest margin.  But they may also have Provided  a greater amount of fee-based
services than banks in other countries.  Until the recent financial liberalization, banks in
Scandinavian  countries were encouraged  to provide guarantees  to large local corporations
to support their borrowings from the eurocurrency  markets.  They were also encouraged  to
offer various seooices  in the housing finance field but without undertaking the long-term
funding of residential mortgages. Both activities generated  fees without  increasing  the
balance sheet totals of banks. It is notable that banks in Norway and Sweden also had
relatively high levels of fee income.
Banks  in several countries (Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) had
unusually  high levels of provisions. However, this item probably covered not only
provisions against doubtful debts, but also provisions for depreciation, pensions and losses
on holdings of securities. In other countries, provisions for depreciation and pensions
would be classified under operating costs.  In contrast, banks in Belgium  and Japan
showed very low levels of provisions,  which suggests  that provisions in these countries
were reported under operating costs.  These differences in the accounting treatment of
provisions imply that attention should perhaps  be focussed only on total operating costs.
Table 10 presents  the operating asset ratios of four types of commercial  banks In the
United States, several types of banks in Germany,  and two types of banks in the United
Kingdom, Spain, Canada  and the Netherlands  over the period 1985-895. The data show
that German  giro landesbanks,  the UK building societies, the Canadian  foreign commercial
banks, the Dutch commercial banks and the German  commercial banks had, in that order,
the lowest gross margins. They also had the lowest interest margins  and lowest operating
costlasset ratios, although the order was slightly different for these ratios.
Thus, the correlation between the level of margins and the level of costs that was
found in Table 9 for commercial banks in 16 OECD  countries is confirmed for a more
detailed classification of banks in a smaller number of countries.  This finding is further
underscored  by the very lovw  gross margins  and other operating assst ratios of the giro
landesbanks  in Germany. These  banks operate as the central clearing institutions for the
German  savings banks and specialize  almost exclusively in interbank and wholesale
business.
American commercial banks operated with gross margins that were 200 basis points
greater than those of German  commercial  banks over the 1985-89 period.  Moreover,the
operating ratios of US commercial  banks increased  during the 1  980s, whereas those of
German  banks declined.
Among different types of American banks,  the lowest gross m3rgin was registered
by the money center banks, which also had the lowest interest margin and lowest
operating costs.  But money center banks reported very high levels of fee income, which is
consistent with their specialization  in such services as trade and foreign exchange  finance
and their growing involvement in investment banking outside the United States.
5  The data for Spanish  banks  cover the period 1986-89 and those for Canadian  banks  the
period 1984-88.
24Worth noting also are the very high gross margins  of the large UK commercial banks
and the Spanish  commercial  and savings banks. These banks also continued to show high
operating costs.
American banks increased substantially their provisions in the secord half of the
1980s, from 0.49% to 0.84%.  For the money center banks, provisions reached  a
staggering 1.12% of average  total assets. In contrast, German  commercial banks reduced
their provisions from 0.54% to only 0.13%.  To a large extent, this reflected the earlier
provisioning against loans to developing  countries by the more cautious German  banks.
But the loss provisions of American banks were inflated in recent years by their massive
losses and nonperforming  loans in real estate loans and highly leveraged  transactions.  The
large UK commercial  banks also experienced  a big rise in their loss provisions.
Except for Canadian  banks, the banks with the highest ROAs also had the highest
gross margins in the early 1980s.  At the other end of the scale, the banks with the
lowest margins also reported the lowest ROAs, except for Swiss banks whlich showed a
relatively high ROA, mainly because  of their success  in generating a high level of fe-
income.
In the more recent period, most types of German  banks as well as the UK building
societies reported higher ROAs  than the American commercial banks and the large UK
commercial  banks, even though their gross margins were generally  much lower.  The ROA
of US money center banks was particularly low.  The breakdown of the correlation
between high margins and higl  ROAs should be attributed to the unusually high levels of
loss provisions experienced  by commercial  banks in the United States and the United
Kingdom  and the very special nature of the business  of UK building societies. The pattern
still held true for the Spanish  commercial  and savings banks and the German  giro
landesbanks.
3.2  Oneating Income Ratios
Operating income ratios relate revenues  and costs to the gross income of banks.
Like operating asset ratios, these ratios are also affected by differences in capital structure
and accounting practices, but they are influenced less by differences in business  mix.
Three ratios are of particular importance: the share of fee income in total gross income,
the cost/income ratio and the profit ratio, i.e the ratio of net income to gross income.
The structure of gross income is interesting because  of the growing importance  that
commercial banks attach to the development  of fee-based  services. The share of
noninterest income provides an indication of the extent to which banks are successful in
generating income from fee-based  services to offset the fall in income from the narrowing
of interest rate spreads.
The securitization of corporate lending and household  finance has resulted in the
removal of a growing volume of bank loans from bank balance  sheets.  It has also
stimulated the growth of noninterest income as banks have sought to provide varicus
25services  linked to the issue of commercial  paper and other securities by the corporate
sector and to the origination of mortgage  loans and consumer credit.
Fee income is also generated  in other more traditional bank services linked with
foreign trade, bank guarantees,  securities transactions and mergers  and acquisitions.
Finnish  and Swiss banks had the highest noninterest Income  ratios of 53% and 47%
respectively durirg the period 1980-86 (Table 11).  UK, Swedish and Norwegian banks
posted ratios in excess of 30%.  Rather surprisingly, American and Canadian  banks
reported lower relative levels of fee income than German  and Italian banks. It is not clear
why Canadian  banks did not develop further their fee-based  services, but in the case of
the American banks, the low ratio is due to the part played by the large number of small
local banks.
In the more recent period between 1985 and 1989, American commercial banks
raised the contribution of noninterest income to 31  % of gross income (Table 12).  Among
different types of banks, the money center banks reported fee income equal to 46% of
gross income.  They were followed by the group of other large banks, which mainly
includes the so-called super-regionals,  with 32%, the medium-size  banks with 26% and
the small local banks with  17%.
In contrast to American banks, the German  commercial  banks did not show an
increase  in their reliance on fee-based  services. Moreover, noncommercial  German  banks
showed a very low contribution from fee-based  services. The large UK commercial banks,
the Canadian  banks and the Dutch commercial  banks showed above average  levels of
noninterest income.
Because  of the general correlation between marginswand  costs, the cost/income ratio
does not show much variation across banks, despite some substantial differences in
product mix.  With the exception of banks in Switzerland and Luxembourg  on the one
hand, and Belgium  and Finland  on the other, banks in most countries reported operating
cost/income ratios in the region between 60% and 70% in the early 1980s.  Banks with
ratios closer to the lower end of this range tended to include some provisions, such as
those for depreciation and pensions,  with loss provisions rather than with operating costs.
The total costs to income ratio, which covers both operating expenses  and all types
of provisions, shows a much narrower variation.  Banks in 10 countries reported total
cost/income ratios in the region between 79% and 85%.  Banks  in Finland, France  and
Portugal  had ratios slightly in excess of 85%, while banks in Japan, Switzerland and
Luxembourg  had ratios below 79%.
The pattern in the more recent period  for banks in six countries was somewhat
different, especially  for the total cost to income ratio.  Because  of the generally  lower
levels of provisions, German  commercial  banks reported total cost/income ratios of around
76%.  The savings banks also exhibited a similar ratio, although in their case, provisions
were higher but operating costs much lower, a pattern that was even more pronounced  for
the giro landesbanks.
26The  large  structural  differences  in the cost/income  ratios  of German  savings  banks
and  credit cooperatives  is worth noting. Savings  banks  enjoyed  substantially  lower
operating  costs, although  these  were  largely,  but not completely,  offset by significantly
higher  levels  of provisions.  Three  possible  explanations  can be advanced  for this. The
first Is the possibility  of substantial  differences  in accounting  practices  even  among
different  types  of banks  in the same  country. The  second  explanation  is that, even  though
both  types  of banks  specialize  in retail  banking  and  serve  the banking  needs  of smaller
firms, credit cooperatives  are operationally  less  efficient than  savings  banks. The  third
explanation  Is that credit cooperatives  are  better  at monitoring  the performance  of their
customers  and  thus at avoiding  loan  losses  than the savings  banks,  but their greater
monitoring  effort is reflected  in higher  operating  costs. Without  more  detailed  knowledge
of the operations  and  accounting  practices  of these  banks,  it is not possible  to say which
explanation  Is more  likely to be valid.
Spanish  commercial  banks  were  able  to report  low total cost/income  ratios  at 76%.
but commercial  banks  in the United  States  and  the United  Kingdom  as well as the Spanish
savings  banks  had  ratios  between  80% and  95%, except  for the US  money  center  banks
which posted  a very high  ratio  of 92%. The  ratio of provisions  to gross  Income  at 24%
was 8 times  as large  as the corresponding  ratio  of the big German  banks.
Finally,  the low cost/income  ratio of Canadian  commercial  banks  and,  especially  the
UK  building  societies,  are  worth stressing. At 48%, the cost/income  ratio  of building
societies  Is at a level  that most  commercial  bankers  can only dream  about. Building
societies  combine  low margins  with low costs  that leave  them  with a very high profit ratio
of 52% of gross  Income,  almost  twice the level  of any other group  of banks  shown  in
these  tables. The  explanation  for this remarkable  performance  lies in their specialization  in
a market  with a well established  demand  for a proven  product  and  the efficient offer of a
simple  range  of services.
The  profit ratio is equal  to one minus  the total cost/income  ratio. It ranges  between
15% and  25% of gross  income  for most  types  of banks. Major  exceptions  are, on the one
hand,  the UK  building  socie  les, which as already  noted  achieved  a remarkable  52% profit
ratio, and,  on the other,  the US  money  center  banks,  which  find themselves  at the other
end  of the spectrum  with a profit ratio  of only 8%.
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OPERATING  INCOME  RATIOS
percent  of gross income
COMMERCIAL  BANKS, AVERAGE  1980-86
Non-  Pre-tax  After-tax
Interest  Interest  Cross  operat.  Provis.  Total  Net  Taxes  Net
Margin  Income  Income  Costs  Costs  Income  Income
Belgium  78.4  21.6  100.0  82.6  0.5  83.0  17.0  6.9  10.1
Canada (1982-86)  77.2  22.8  100.0  61.6  17.1  78.7  21.3  5.4  15.9
Fintand  46.9  53.1  100.0  77.6  9.2  86.7  13.3  3.8  9.4
France  84.9  15.1  100.0  67.8  19.9  87.7  12.3  5.4  6.9
Germany  71.8  28.2  100.0  64.8  16.4  81.2  18.8  10.3  8.5
Italy  (1980-85)  72.6  27.4  100.0  65.6  17.2  82.8  17.2  9.5  7.7
Japan  83.5  16.5  100.0  70.0  1.8  71.8  28.2  14.7  13.5
Luxembourg  81.1  18.9  100.0  30.3  46.2  76.5  23.5  12.1  11.4
Netherlands  75.5  24.5  100.0  64.6  19.2  83.8  16.2  0.0  0.0
Norway  69.4  30.6  100.0  69.7  15.4  85.0  15.0  2.8  12.2
Portugal  69.3  30.7  100.0  61.7  24.3  86.0  14.0  1.8  12.3
Spain  82.5  17.5  100.0  66.4  18.8  85.2  14.8  4.0  10.8
Sweden (1981-86)  68.3  31.7  100.0  61.2  24.2  85.4  14.6  7.5  7.1
Swit2erland  53.2  46.8  100.0  55.6  17.1  72.6  27.4  7.9  19.4
United  Kingdom  67.5  32.5  100.0  69.0  10.5  79.5  20.5  7.3  13.2
r;i  United  States  74.4  25.6  100.0  68.1  11.3  79.4  20.6  4.8  15.7
aoTABLE 12
OPERATING  INCONE  RATIOS
percent  of  gross  income
AVERAGE  1985-89
Non-  Pre-tax  After-tax
Interest  Interest  Gross  Operat.  Provis.  lotal  Net  Taxes  Net
Nargin  Income  Income  Costs  Costs  Incoe  Incoame
UNITED STATES
All  Co  mercial  Banks  69.0  31.0  100.0  66.8  17.1  83.9  16.1  4.7  11.4
Smell banks  82.8  17.2  100.0  68.5  13.3  81.8  18.2  3.7  14.r,
Nedium banks  73.7  26.3  100.0  68.4  13.2  81.6  18.4  4.0  14.4
oney  centre  banks  53.7  46.3  100.0  67.9  24.5  92.4  7.6  4.1  3.5
Other  large  banks  67.6  32.4  100.0  66.1  19.2  85.3  14.7  3.1  11.6
GERMANY
All  commercial  banks  75.2  24.8  100.0  71.8  4.4  76.2  23.8  12.9  10.9
Big  commercial  banks  72.6  27.4  100.0  72.1  3.1  75.1  24.9  13.7  11.2
Savings  banks  90.2  9.8  100.0  63.6  12.7  76.3  23.7  15.7  8.0
Credit  cooperatives  88.7  11.3  100.0  78.9  2.0  80.9  19.1  13.0  6.1
Giro  landesbanks  88.6  11.4  100.0  54.5  19.3  73.9  26.1  17.0  9.1
UNITED  KINGDON
Large  commercial  banks  65.2  34.8  100.0  66.5  16.5  82.9  17.1  6.9  10.2
Building  societies  85.0  15.0  100.0  47.9  0.0  47.9  52.1  18.8  33.3
SPAIN (1986-89)
Commercial  banks  80.2  19.8  100.0  63.7  12.6  76.2  23.8
Savings  banks  87.9  12.1  100.0  75.2  6.3  81.5  18.5
CANADA  (1984-88)
Domestic  banks  74.1  25.9  100.0  58.7  17.3  76.0  24.3  8.0  16.0
Foreign  banks  70.6  29.4  100.0  62.0  13.9  75.9  24.1  12.2  11.8
NETHERLANDS
Commercial  banks  73.2  26.8  100.0  65.9  8.3  74.3  25.7
Savings  banks  91.5  8.5  100.0  69.2  1.2  70.4  29.6la  Onerating  Enuitv  Ratio;
Operating  equity ratios  relate  revenues,  costs  and profits to average  equity. They
are  not affected  by differences  in capital  structure  and business  mix but, like the other
ratios,  they can be heavily  distorted  by differences  in accounting  practices.
Traditionally,  analytical  attention  has  focussed  on the ROE,  which is the ratio of not
income  (before  or after taxes)  to average  equity. The ROE  is about  the bottom  line and  is
the one  measure  that should  matter  most  in analyzing  bank  performance.  Some  analysts
pay more  attention  to the ROA  but, as already  argued  above,  this is distorted  by the level
of equity  capitalization  ratio. On  the other  hand,  although  the ROE  would be higher  for a
more  highly leveraged  bank,  this could  merely  reflect  the higher  risks  faced  by such  banks
and  should  not be  taken as an indication  of higher  efficiency.
Two measures  that provide  an  indication  of the higher  risks  faced  by more  highly
leveraged  banks  are the gross  income  to equity  ratio  and the total costs  to equity ratios.
These  two ratios  wculd indicate  the extent  of overtrading  or undertrading  of banks  and
would  thus merit greater  attention  when  analyzing  the performance  of different  banks.
The equity  capitalization  ratios  of banks  varied  over  the 1980-86 period  from a high
7.9% for Spanish  banks  and 7.1  % for Finnish  banks  to a low 1.4% for Swedish  banks  and
2.4% for French  and  Japanese  banks  (Table  13). In the more  recent  period,  the small
American  commercial  banks  and  the Dutch  savings  banks  had  the highest  equity
capitalization  ratio at over  8% (Table  14).
The  gross income  and  total costs  to equity  ratios strongly  suggest  that Swedish
banks  were  heavily  overtrading  in the early  1980s  with ratios  in excess  of 200%. In fact,
because  of their  very low level of equity,  Swedish  commercial  banks  reported  a ROE  of
34%. even  though  their ROA  was only 0.47%.  Other  banks  with high Income  and cost to
equity ratios  included  the French,  Italian,  UK  and  Norwegian  banks. The  first two hadl
rather  low equity  levels  but the last two were  rather  highly  capitalized.
At the other end  of the scale,  banks  in Luxembourg  and  Switzerland,  and  to a lesser
extent,  Spain  and Portugal  had  low income  and  cost to equity ratios,  suggesting  that these
banks  were  probably  undertrading.  But banks  in these  countries  generally  reported  low
ROEs,  a finding  that Is rather  surprising  in the case  of Swiss banks. The  highest  ROE  was
displayed  by Swedish  banks,  followed  by UK  and  Japanese  banks.
The  operating  equity  ratios  for the more  recent  period  1985-89 underscore  the
disastrous  performance  of American  money  center  banks  (Table  14). These  banks  had
relatively  high levels  of trading  with a gross  income  to equity ratio  of 100%, but their cost
performance,  and  especially  their  loss  provisions,  caused  their pre-tax  ROE  to be as low as
8% and  their after tax ROE  to be a paltry 3.5%. After allowing  for Inflation,  but without
taking  Into account  revaluation  gains  on fixed assets and  trade  investments,  the real ROE
was a paltry 0.3% (see  below,  Table  15). The  small  local American  banks  displayed  low
levels  of trading  v:  Ith ratios  of 60% and  49% but their ROE,  though  higher  than the money
center  banks,  was  low by comparison  to European  commercial  banks.
30TABLE  13
OPERATING  EQUITY  RATIOS
percent of  average equity
COMMERCIAL  BANKS,  AVERAGE  1980-86
Non-  Pre-tax  After-tax  Memo
Interest  Interest  Gross  Operat.  Provis.  Total  Net  Taxes  Net  Equity
Margin  Incare  Income  Costs  Costs  Income  Income  Ratio
Belgium  69.5  19.1  88.6  73.2  0.4  73.6  15.0  6.1  8.9  2.46 Canada  (1982-86)  60.0  17.8  77.8  47.9  13.3  61.2  16.6  4.2  12.4  4.28
Finland  26.0  29.4  55.4  43.0  5.1  48.1  7.4  2.1  5.2  7.07 France  114.5  20.4  134.9  91.5  26.8  118.3  16.6  7.2  9.4  2.35 Germany  57.7  22.6  80.3  52.1  13.1  65.2  15.1  8.3  6.8  4.11 Italy  (1980-85)  83.8  31.6  115.4  75.7  19.8  95.6  19.8  11.0  8.9  3.83 Japan  60.2  11.9  72.0  50.4  1.3  51.7  20.3  10.6  9.7  2.36 Luxembourg  33.3  7.8  41.1  12.5  19.0  31.5  9.7  5.0  4.7  3.21
Netherlands  66.1  21.4  87.5  56.5  16.8  73.3  14.2  na  na  3.45 Norway  70.0  30.8  100.9  70.3  15.5  85.8  15.1  2.8  12.3  4.64
Portugal  39.4  17.5  56.9  35.1  13.8  48.9  8.0  1.0  7.0  6.01 Spain  49.4  10.5  59.9  39.8  11.3  51.1  8.9  2.4  6.5  7.89 Sweden  (1981-86)  160.6  74.5  235.0  143.8  56.9  200.7  34.3  17.5  16.8  1.37 Switzerland  22.7  20.0  42.6  23.7  7.3  31.0  11.7  3.4  8.3  5.91 United  Kingdom  69.7  33.5  103.1  71.1  10.9  82.0  21.1  7.5  13.6  4.78 United  States  53.7  18.5  72.2  49.2  8.2  57.3  14.8  3.5  11.3  6.00TABLE  14
OPERATING  EWITY RATIOS
percent  of  average  equity
AVERAGE  1985-89
Non-  Pre-tax  After-tax  Meo
Interest  Interest  Gross  Operat.  Provis.  Total  Net  Taxes  Net  Equity
Nargin  Inc  Income  Costs  Costs  Income  Income  Ratio
UNITED  STATES
All  Ccmmercial Banks  55.0  24.7  79.7  53.2  13.6  66.9  12.8  3.7  9.1  6.16
Smtll  banks  49.6  10.3  59.9  41.1  8.0  49.0  10.9  2.2  8.7  8.16
Medium banks  H.9  20.3  77.3  52.8  10.2  63.1  14.2  3.1  11.1  6.55
Noey  centre  banks  53.7  46.3  100.0  67.9  24.5  92.4  7.6  4.1  3.5  4.58
Other  large  banks  60.4  29.0  89.5  59.1  17.2  76.3  13.1  2.8  10.4  5.41
GERPANY
ALL  cooercial  banks  47.5  15.7  63.2  45.4  2.8  48.2  15.1  8.2  6.9  4.65
Big commercial  bans  55.6  20.9  76.5  55.1  2.4  57.5  19.0  10.5  8.5  4.68
Savings  banks  81.3  8.8  90.1  57.3  11.5  68.8  21.3  14.1  7.2  3.75
Credit  cooperatives  79.7  10.1  89.9  70.9  1.8  72.7  17.1  11.7  5.5  3.85
Giro  landesbmnks  33.9  4.3  38.3  20.9  7.4  28.3  10.0  6.5  3.5  2.30
UNITED  KINGDOM
Large commercial  banks  63.8  34.0  97.8  65.0  16.1  81.1  16.7  6.8  9.9  5.03
Building  societies  47.6  8.4  55.9  26.8  0.0  26.8  29.1  10.5  18.6  4.29
SPAIN  (1986-89)
Coe=mrcial  banks  61.4  15.1  76.5  48.7  9.6  58.3  18.2  6.55
Savings  banks  83.3  11.5  94.8  71.3  6.0  77.3  17.5  6.00
CANADA  (1984-88)
Domestic  banks  57.6  20.1  77.6  45.5  13.5  59.0  18.8  6.2  12.4  4.83
Foreign  banks  23.1  9.6  32.8  20.3  4.5  24.9  7.9  4.0  3.9  7.46
NETHERLANDS
Commercial banks  50.5  18.5  69.0  45.5  5.8  51.3  17.8  4.00
Savings  banks  37.9  3.5  41.4  28.6  0.5  29.1  12.3  8.24Among German  banks, the giro landesbanks  had low trading ratios as might be
expected, though rather surprisingly they also showed a low ROE. The income and cost to
equity ratios of the other banks were generally  in the middle range and their ROEs  were
respectable  but not too high.
The performance  of UK building societies is again worth noting.  These institutions
generally  had low levels of Income and cost to equity ratios, suggesting a low level of
trading, but because  of a better containment of costs (their cost to equity ratio was by far
the lowest among all types of institutions reviewed in this paper), their ROE  was a quite
high 29%.
The data on Tables 13 and 14 show the nominal ROEs  for different banks without
taking account of differences in Inflation rates.  A full Inflation adjustment of nominal
raturns would require an estimate of the revaluation gains on fixed assets, which are likely
to be large for banks with extensive branch networks, as well as on marketable  securities
for those banks that report their securities at the lower of cost or market value.  Such data
are not readily available.
Table 15 reports data on real ROEs  on a pre-tax and after-tax basis by adjusting
nominal returns by the average  GDP  deflator for each country.  Although this is an
incomplete adjustment, it provides an indication of the monetary correction that is
necessary  In different countries. Thus, Spanish  banks which report high nominal rates of
return, are shown after the adjustment to have moderate  levels of real profitability.  In
contrast, the UK building societies, German  savings banks, and German,  Dutch and
Canadian  commercial banks report high real rates of return.  Worth noting are the very low




Commercial and Other Banks, 1985-89
Pro  After  Pro  After
Tax  Tax  Inflation Tax  Tax
Nominal  Nominal  Rate  Real  Real
ROE  ROE  ROE  ROE
United States
All commercial banks  12.8  9.1  3.2  9.6  S.9
Small  banks  10.9  8.7  3.2  7.7  5.5
Medium banks  14.2  11.1  3.2  11.0  7.9
Money center banks  7.6  3.5  3.2  4.4  0.3
Other large banks  13.1  10.4  3.2  9.9  7.2
All co-mercial banks  15.1  8.2  2.3  12.8  5.9
Big co  e-rcial  banks  19.0  10.5  2.3  16.7  8.2
Savings banks  21.3  14.1  2.3  19.0  11.8
Credit  cooperatives  17.1  11.7  2.3  14.8  9.4
aLro landesbanks  10.0  6.5  2.3  7.7  4.2
Unlted Kinadom
Large comercial  banks  16.7  9.9  5.4  11.3  4.5
Building societies  29.1  18.6  5.4  23.7  13.2
Spain  t1986-891
Comercial  banks  18.2  7.8  10.4
Savings  banks  17.5  7.8  9.7
Canada (1984-88
Domestic  banks  18.8  12.4  3.5  15.3  8.9
Foreign banks  7.9  3.9  3.5  4.4  0.4
N2thorlanda
Commercial banks  17.8  1.  0  16.8
Savings  banks  12.3  1.0  11.3
34IV.  ANALYTICAL  AND POLICY  ISSUES
There  are a number  of analytical  and policy  issues  that arise  from the preceding
discussion  of bank  operating  ratios. Are  the observed  differences  In operating  ratios
merely  the result of differences  In capital  structure,  business  mix and  accounting
conventions  or do they reflect,  at least  In part,  differences  in efficiency? What is the
correlation  between  different  ratios? Is there  a combination  of ratios  that could  be most
useful  In summarizing  the performance  of banks  In different  countries?
Moreover,  two of the most striking  results  of the analysis  of bank  operating  ratios
are  the significant  differences  In performance  between  American  and German  banks  on the
one hand  and  between  the large UK  commercial  banks  and building  societies  on the other.
In the context of the discussion  of the determinants  of bank  operating  ratios,  two
questions  of wider  interest  arise. First, are  American  banks  really  so much  less  efficient
than German  banks  as their respective  operating  ratios  suggest?  And, second,  what
special  factors  could  explain  the substantial  differences  In performance  between  UK
commercial  banks  and  building  societies?
Finally,  there  Is  the question  of what are  the Implications  of the approach  and results
of this paper  for analyzing  the performance  of banks  In developing  countries.
4.1  ROE  and Covariane  Analysis
In terms  of the first set of questions,  a ROE  analysis  provides  a combination  of ratios
that may  best  summarize  the variuus  operating  ratios  and may  be most  useful  in analyzing
differences  In performance  across  groups  of banks  or across  countries. The ROE  analysis
of Tables  16 and 17 brings  together  in a simple  tabulated  form, not only the ROE  and  ROA
but also  the leverage,  gross  margin  and  profit ratio of different  groups  of banks.
Moreover,  although  not shown  explicitly,  the total cost/asset  and  total cost/income  ratios
can be  easily  Inferred  from the tables. Table  16 shows  the ROE  analysis  for the period
1980-86  and  Table  17 for the period  1985-89. The  correlation  between  profitability  ratios
is shown  In Figures  1 and  2.
Table  16 shows  clearly  that both  banks  with low gross  margins  and  low ROAs
(Japan,  Sweden)  and  banks  with high  gross margins  and high  ROAs  (United  Kingdom)  can
have  high  ROEs.  The  table  also  suggests  that countries  with fragmented  banking  systems,
such  as the United  States,  Norway  and  Italy where  there are  large  numbers  of banks  with
regional  specialization,  tend to have  higher  operating  ratios  than countries  with more
consolidated  banking  systems,  such  as Canada,  the Netherlands  and Sweden,  where  there
is a smaller  number  of banks  with nationwide  operations.  However,  this pattern  does  not
apply  In all cases  since  the United  Kingdom,  and  to a lesser  extent,  Spain  have
consolidated  banking  systems  but their commercial  banks  exhibit  high margins.
Table  17 summarizes  the performance  of banks  in different  countries  In the more
recent  period. The  contrasting  experience  of money  center  banks  and small  and mediurnm-
size  banks  in the United  States  is clearly  highlighted  as is that between  commercial  banks
35Table  l6
ROE  Analysis
Commercial  Banks,  1980-86
Profit  Gross  ROA  Lever  ROE
Ratio  Margin
Belgium  (BEL)  17.0  2.18  0.37  40.7  15.0
Canada  (CAN)  (1982-86)  21.3  3.33  0.71  23.4  16.6
Finland  (FIN)  13.3  3.92  0.52  14.1  7.4
France  (FRA)  12.3  3.17  0.39  42.6  16.6
Germany  (DEU)  18.8  3.30  0.62  24.3  1S.1
Italy  (ITA)  (1980-85)  17.2  4.42  0.76  26.1  19.8
Japan  (JPN)  28.2  1.70  0.48  42.4  20.3
Luxembourg  (LUX)  23.5  1.32  0.31  31.2  9.7
Netherlands  (NLD)  16.2  3.02  0.49  29.0  14.2
Norway  (NOR)  15.0  4.68  0.70  21.6  15.1
Portugal  (PRT)  14.0  3.42  0.48  16.6  8.0
Spain  (ESP)  14.8  4.73  0.70  12.7  8.9
Sweden  (SWE)  (1981-86)  14.6  3.22  0.47  73.0  34.3
Switzerland  (CRE)  27.6  2.52  0.69  16.9  11.7
United  Kingdom  (GBR)  20.5  4.93  1.01  20.9  21.1
United  States  (USA)  20.6  4.33  0.89  16.7  14.8
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ROn AnalysiA
Commercial and Other Banks, 1985-89
Profit  Gross  ROA  Lover  ROB
Ratio  Margin
United State.
All  comercial  banks  (USA1)  16.1  4.91  0.79  16.2  12.8
small banks  (USA2)  18.2  4.89  0.89  12.3  10.9
Medium  banks  (USA3)  18.4  5.06  0.93  15.3  14.2
Money  center  banks  (USA4)  7.6  4.58  0.35  21.8  7.6
other  large  banks  (USA5)  24.7  4.84  0.71  18.5  13.1
All  co-mercial  banks  (DEU1)  23.8  2.94  0.70  21.5  15.1
Big  comercial  banks  (DEU2)  24.9  3.58  0.89  21.4  19.0
Savings  banks  (DEU3)  23.7  3.38  0.80  26.7  21.3
Credit  cooperatLves  (DEU4)  19.1  3.46  0.66  26.0  17.1
airo  landesbanks  (DEU5)  26.1  0.88  0.23  43.5  10.0
United Kinadom
Large  comercial  banks  (03R1)  17.1  4.92  0.84  19.9  16.7
Building  societies  (GBR2)  52.1  2.40  1.25  23.3  29.1
scainm  1966-891
Commercial banks  (ESP1)  23.8  5.01  1.19  15.3  18.2
Savings  banks  (ESP2)  18.5  5.69  1.05  16.7  17.5
Canada  t1984-88t
Domestic  banks (CAN1)  24.3  3.75  0.91  20.7  18.8
Foreign banks (CAN2)  24.1  2.45  0.59  13.4  7.9
N therlandA
Commercial  banks  (NLD1)  25.7  2.76  0.71  25.0  17.8
Savings  banks  (NLD2)  29.6  3.41  1.01  12.1  12.3
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g and building societies in the United Kingdom. commercial  and savings banks in the
Netherlands  and Spain, and domestic and foreign commercial  banks in Canada.
A simple covadiance  analysis  shows the degree of correlation between various bank
operating ratios.  Table 18 summarizes  the correlation coefficients for the ratios that are
included in the ROE  analysis, except that the equity capitalization ratio Is used instead of
its inverse.  A clearly different pattern characterizes  the data of the two different periods.
This may reflect a change over time in the underlying performance  of banks but it may
also be due to differences in the characteristics of banks included in the two samples.
For the 1980-86 period, the data show that the ROE  has a high negative correlation
with the equity capitalization  ratio but is not closely linked with either the ROA, gross
margin or profit ratio.  There is a strong positive correlation between the equity
capitalization ratio and both the ROA and the gross margin and especially  between the
gross margin and the ROA. A very high correlation (not shown in the table) also exists
between the gross margin and the cost/asset ratio (0.99).
In the 1985-89 period, the matrix of correlation coefficients is substantially different.
In the first place, the ROE  is now highly and positively correlated  with the profit ratio
(0.68) and the ROA (0.67).  Its negative correlation with the equity capitalization ratio is
much reduced, The gross margin is less well correlated  with the ROA, while in contrast,
the profit ratio and ROA exhibit closer positive covariance. In general,  the gross margin
and equity capitalization  ratio are less well correlated with other variables  in the more
recent period. Note, however, that the gross margin and total cost/asset ratio continue to




PR  GM  ROA  ECR  ROE
Profit  ratio  (PR)  1.00
Gross margin  (GM)  -0.49  1.00
ROA  0.17  0.76  1.00
Equity  Capital  (ECR)  -0.09  0.54  0.48  1.00
ROE  0.03  0.03  0.11  -0.69  1.00
1985-89
PR  GM  ROA  ECR  ROE
Profit  ratio  (PR)  1.00
gross  margin  (ON)  -0.57  1.00
ROA  0.47  0.41  1.00
Equity  capital  (ECR)  -0.14  0.50  0.44  1.00
ROE  0.68  -0.07  0.67  -0.34  1.00
40As already noted, it is not clear whether the significant change  in the correlation
pattern of different operating ratios reflects a change  in performance, resulting from a
greater emphasis  on profitability and smaller variation in equity capitalization  ratios or
whether It is simply the result of sample differences.  However, the covariance analysis
lends support to the argument that high gross margins, cost/asset ratios and ROAs are not
necessarily  indicative of either high inefficiency or high profitability, but may mainly reflect
the business  mix and capital structure of different banks.
4.2  Differences between American and German  Banks
Table 19 shows the operating ratios of all commercial  banks in the United States and
Germany  for two periods - 1980-86 and 1985-89 and for the money center banks and big
German  banks for  1985-89.
German  banks report much lower gross margins  and cost/asset ratios than their
American counterparts.  The difference in gross margins for all commercial  banks is almost
200 basis points in the more recent period, while that between big banks is 100 basis
points.  Differences in operating costs are less pronounced, while the profitability of
American banks is much lower in the more recent period because  of their very large loss
provisions.
Although German  banks may indeed be more efficient than American banks, there
are a number of factors that may explain at least some of the difference in performance.
The first such factor relates to their different equity capitalization ratios.  US commercial
banks have higher capitalization than German  ones. In the more recent period the
difference is just over 1.50% of total assets. To achieve the same ROE,  American banks
would require a ROA of 0.93 against 0.70 for German  banks. However, the capital
structure of large banks is, if anything, the reverse, with the big German  banks reporting a
slightly higher level of equity than American money center banks.
The second  factor relates to their business  mix.  American banks engage to a greater
extent in loan securitization and fee-based  services  than German  banks. In addition,
American households  place a greater proportion of their financial assets in mutual funds
and marketable  securities as well as in contractual savings than German  households.
Thus, German  banks may be able to generate  a greater volume of business  from a given
cost base (including branch networks and staff) than American banks.  Differences  in
business  mix may be particularly important for the comparison of operating ratios of large
banks since money center banks in the United States generate  almost half of their gross
Income  from fee-based  services.
German  banks operate a much larger branch network in relation to population than
US banks, both on an individual bank basis and for the system as a whole.  Branch density
is over 750 branches  per million people  in Germany  against 450 branches  in the United
States.  Moreover, like their counterparts in other European  countries, they offer a more
complete range of payment services, with electronic payments, especially  direct debits and
direct deposit of payroll and other credit transfers, representing 58% of all payments
against only 3% for the United Stav.es.  German  banks also operate as universal banks,
41Table  19
Operating  Ratios  of US and  German  Banks
1980-86  1985-89  1985-89
US  German  US  Gronan  KCB  BOB
banks  banks
Onerating  asset  ratios
Interest margin  3.22  2.37  3.39  2.21  2.46  2.60
Noninterest  income  1.11  0.93  1.52  0.73  2.12  0.98
Gross income  4.33  3.30  4.91  2.94  4.58  3.58
Operating  costs  2.95  2.14  3.28  2.11  3.11  2.58
Loss provisions  0.49  0.54  0.84  0.13  1.12  0.11
Total costs  3.44  2.68  4.12  2.24  4.23  2.69
ROA  0.89  0.62  0.79  0.70  0.35  0.89
Equity  capitalization  6.00  4.11  6.16  4.65  4.58  4.68
oGeratina  income  ratios
Interest  margin  74.4  71.8  69.0  75.2  53.7  72.6
Noninterest  income  25.6  28.2  31.0  24.8  46.3  27.4
Operating  costs  68.1  64.8  66.8  71.8  67.9  72.1
Loss  provisions  11.3  16.4  17.1  4.4  24.5  3.1
Total costs  79.4  81.2  83.9  76.2  92.4  75.1
Profit  ratio  20.6  18.8  16.1  23.6  7.6  24.9
oGeratina  eouitv  ratios
Gross  income  72.2  80.3  79.7  63.2  100.0  76.5
Total  costs  57.3  65.2  66.9  48.2  92.4  57.5
RON  14.8  15.1  12.8  15.1  7.6  19.0
42acting as stockbrokers as well as issuing and underwriting houses in the securities
markets.  The implication of offering a more extensive range of financial services is that
customers have less need to maintain separate  account facilities with independent
stockbrokers, mutual funds or money market mutual funds as In the United States.
German  banks may benefit from both economies  of scale and scope.
In the United States, the advent of mortgage  securitization has a large potential
impact on bank operating ratios.  Traditionally, mortgage business  has been a low margin,
large value noncorporate line of business  that helped lower operating ratios, while making
a significant contribution to profits, especially  if banks were able to avoid losses from
interest rate mismatching and loan defaults.  Mortgage securitization removes low margin,
large value business  from bank balance sheets and also generates  hefty origination and
servicing fees that tend to inflate noninterest  income.  Operating ratios for a bank that
engages in mortgage origination and securitization are therefore raised on two grounds:
first, because  the mix of business  that is reported on the balance sheet is tilted towards
high margin business  and, second, because  noninterest operating costs and revenues  are
higher for a given asset base.
Mortgage-backed  securities in the United States passed  the 1 trillion dollar mark In
September 1990 and now represent  40% of all residential mortgages. Whether the
growth of mortgage securitization explains the higher operating ratios of American banks Is
difficult to say.  It should, however, be noted that the potential Impact of securitization on
operating ratios is weakened by the fact that commercial  banks hold between 15% and
20% of outstanding mortgage-backed  securities.
Accounting differences may also contribute to the lower ratios reported by German
banks.  For instance, German  banks make use of hidden reserves,  which may result in an
understatement of reported profits and equity.  Moreover, their fixed assets and holdings
of securities are reported at cost or market value, which also understates both equity and
total assets.  On the other hand, German  banks report on their balance sheet pension and
depreciation  reserves,  which tend to overstate total assets.
If the large German  banks have hidden reserves  that are equal to half their reported
equity and If they maintain hidden reserves at a constant fraction of equity, then their true
equity would be 7.02%, instead of 4.68%,  of assets and their ROA would be 1.33%
rather than 0.89%.  The difference of 0.44% would represent the average annual transfer
to hidden reserves. Assuming that this is split equally between an understatement of net
interest revenues  and an overstatement of noninterest expenses,  the gross margin would
be higher than reported at 3.80%, but the ratio of total operating costs to assets would be
lower at 2.47%.  Thus, the use of hidden reserves  Is likely to understate the operating
performance  of German  banks, although under the assumptions used their reported ROE
would be the same  as the true ROE.
The balance sheet and Income statement of German  banks would also need to be
adjusted  for the pension and depreciation  reserves  that are carried on the balance sheet.  If
total assets are overstated by 15%, then their effective gross margin would be 4.37%,
their total cost ratio 2.84% and their ROA 1.53%.  But as their effective equity
capitalization  ratio would also rise to 8.08%, their ROE  on equity would still be equal to
4319%.  It is interesting that these adjustments bring the gross margin of the big German
banks much closer to that of the big American money center banks, although their
operating costs are still significantly lower.  Moreover, their superior loan loss experience
would be totally unaffected by these adjustments.
Of course, it Is very difficult, If not impossible, to tell how realistic are the
assumptions  that hidden reserves  represent half the reported equity of German  banks and
pension and depreciation reserves  overstate assets by 15%.  However, these assumptions
provide an indication of the orders of magnitude involved if the differences in operating
performance  between German  and American banks are to be explained  by differences in
accounting practices.
Before concluding this section it is worth noting that loss provisions amounted  to
24.5% of the equity of American money center banks. These are five-year averages,
which suggests that either American banks have weak credit departments or competition
is causing a deterioration of credit standards. The operating margins of money center
banks are quite strong, implying that a return to sounder loan books and more normal
levels of provisioning could lift their ROEs  back to very respectable  levels.
4.3  Differenges  between UK Commercial  Banks  and Butling  Societies
The difference in operating ratios between the large UK commercial  banks and the
building societies (Table 20) is interesting because  it Is unlikely to be caused by differences
in accounting conventions or capital structure.  Both groups of institutions follow broadly
similar accounting rules, while their equity capitalization ratios are not very dissimilar -
5.03% for the commercial  banks against 4.29% for the building societies. Thus, the
differences in operating ratios and performance  can be largely explained by differences In
business  mix or in operating efficiency.
As already  remarked  above, building societies are extremely efficient institutions.
They have cost/income ratios of less than 50% and a gross margin of only 2.40%, while
both their ROA and ROE  are very high at 1.25% and 29% respectively. These are among
the best ratios reported by any group of institutions reviewed in this paper.  The secret for
their success appears  to lie In their specialization  In a market with a strong demand  for a
proven product and In their ability to offer a simple range of ancillary services that
complement  their main product. Although societies have met increasing competition from
commercial  banks and specialized  mortgage corporations in the UK market, they have been
able to hold onto their dominant market share.
Building societies have long offered some basic payment services attached to
passbook  savings accounts, but they have not been burdened with the offer of labor-
intensive checking account services. In recent years they have expanded  their payment
facilities, introducing a full range of card-based  and checking account services, but their
share of the market for household  payment services is still small and they do not have to
Incur the operating costs of servicing large numbers of merchants and retailers as do the
commercial banks. In recent years, building societies have diversified into other fields,
such as limited consumer credit and commercial  lending, insurance  brokerage and
44Table  20




Oneratin@  asset  ratios
Interest  margin  3.21  2.04
Noninterest  income  1.71  0.36
Gross  income  4.92  2.40
Operating  costs  3.27  1.15
Loss  provisions  0.81  --
Total  costs  4.08  1.15
ROA  0.84  1.25
Equity  capitalization  5.03  4.29
operatina  income  ratios
Interest  margin  65.2  85.0
Noninterest  income  34.8  15.0
operating  costs  66.5  47.9
Loss  provisions  16.5  --
Total  cost.  82.9  47.9
Profit  ratio  17.1  52.1
Oneratina  equitv  ratios
gross  income  97.8  55.9
Total  costs  81.1  26.8
ROE  16.7  29.1
45underwriting, and real estate agency business. The larger societies have taken advantage
of expansion  opportunities in continental Europe, especially  in countries with less
developed  housing finance markets, such as Italy, Spain and France.
Because  of their diversification into high margin business, they have been able to
increase  their overall margins. However, these developments  In their business  mix are
likely to increase  their operating cost ratios, while their remarkable  record of low loan
losses may also be marred, especially  if they are forced to lower their credit and prudential
standards.
The high operating ratios of the large UK commercial banks, effectively the large four
clearing banks, can be explained, largely but perhaps  not fully, by their rather unique
product mix.  Historically, the UK clearing banks have specialized  in providing short-term,
self-lquidating loans.  They have not engaged  in medium and long-term lending to Industry
or In providing mortgage  finance to their personal  customers.  Despite building very large
branch networks, their share of household  deposits and household  loans has been low.
Their reluctance  to engage  in mortgage lending was premised  on the adage  that It Is
Imprudent to  'borrow  short and lend long".  Since the mid-I 970s, the clearing banks have
changed their approach  to term lending, first by providing variable-rate  medium-term loans
to Industrial and commercial  companies  and then by engaging  on a large scale in variable-
rate housing finance.  However, residential mortgages still represented  less than 11  % of
total domestic assets in 1989.
Apart from focussing on short-term, high margin business,  the UK clearing banks
have also specialized  in operating a nationwide paper-based  payment and clearing system.
This has taken longer to automate and replace  with electronic payments than the payment
systems of other European  countries (electronic payments now represent  about 25% of all
noncash payments - well below the levels achieved in Germany,  the Netherlands  and
Japan though well above the United States).  In addition to offering extensive payment
services and operating the clearing system on their own with little operational Involvement
from the Bank  of England,  the UK clearing banks have also provided extensive and labor-
Intensive services in foreign exchange related business,  including export/import
documentary credits.  Thus, the high operating ratios of the large UK commercial banks
are a direct result of the high margin/low asset value business  mix.
Nevertheless,  their Involvement in high margin business  may not explain fully the
persistence  of their high operating ratios.  The UK clearing banks have been Impeded  in
their efforts to automate and modernize  their operations by the sheer scale of their branch
networks and staff levels. With an average  of 3,000 branches  and well over 60,000 staff
complements,  their plans to computerize  their service delivery systems have Involved
much greater capital out sys,  more extensive retraining and greater dislocation of
management  practices tnan  for banks in most other countries.  In contrast, the building
societies have expanded  their networks In the 1  960s and 1970s and have been able to
implement automation plans more effectively.
464.4  ImRlications  for Develonina  Countnes
As already noted in the introduction of this paper, banks in developing countries
generally operate with wide interest spreads. High spreads  may be caused by government
regulations (such as onerous reserve requirements  and other forms of bank taxation), high
Intiatlon, high loan losses and high costs and profits due to operating inefficiencies and
uncompetitive behavior. A detailed examination  of bank operating ratios in developing
countries Is beyond the scope of this paper". However, the discussion of these issues for
banks in developed  countries has a number of Implications for analyzing bank operating
ratios in developing countries.
The first concerns  the comparability of operating cost data across banks that offer
substantially different types of services. Business  or product mix is one of the most
Important determinants of bank ratios7. Banks  in developing countries generally offer a
narrower range of services at a lower level of quality.  Allowing for this, and the fact that
labor costs are also generally  lower in such countries, both their cost/asset and
cost/income ratios should be smaller  than those of banks In developed  countries that
provide a wider range of services of higher quality.
However, the data contained In Hanson  and Rocha show that there are very few
developing countries where cost/asset ratios are lower than those of developed countries.
One example  Is Malaysia where commercial banks are reported to have a cost/asset ratio
of around 1.3% (Hanson  and Rocha, p. 25).  Banks  in most other developing countries
operate with cost/asset ratios of between 2.0 and 3.5%, except for high inflation
countries where cost ratios are well in excess of 4%.
The point of this analysis  is that even a cost/asset ratio of 2% to 3% may be too
high given the narrow range and low quality of services offered by banks in developing
countries.  The relatively high costs may be explained  by operating inefficiencies (e.g.
limited use of modern technology), by induced overstaffing or by the operation of too
many uneconomic branches. The reasons may vary from country to country but the fact
remains  that the operating ratios of commercial banks in developing countries should be
compared  with banks that offer a broadly similar range of services.
The second major implication concerns  the impact of inflation.  Banks operating in
countries that suffer from high inflation exhibit very high margins  and cost ratios.  As
discussed  In Hanson  and Rocha (p 11), there are three reasons  for this.  First, banks
employ more staff because  of the increased volume of paperwork.  Second, chronic
inflation may lead banks to compete for low cost deposits by expanding  their branch
networlks. Third, Inflation may cause bank disintermediation  which lowers the real value of
assets while operating costs may rise.  Disintermediation  also affects bank operating cost
'  Hanson and Rocha (1986) provide a comprehensive analysis of  bank spreads and
intermediation costs in 16 developing and 10 developed  countries.
7  The Importance  of product mix is highlighted  in Hunter and Timme (1990), who discuss
changes  in employment patterns among the world's largest banks.
47ratios  by affecting  the capital  structure  of banks. Under  high  inflation,  the replacement
value  of fixed assets  prevents  the :osion  of bank  equity  capital  and leads  to a big increase
In the equity capitalization  ratio  of hanks. But  the "free equity' of banks  would be eroded
under  high inflation  so that banks  may earn  very high spreads  In nominal  terms bit  achieve
a very low and sometimes  negative  real  ROE.
The  third implication  concerns  the impact  of loan  provisioning  policies. As noted
above,  banks  in some  European  countries  are allowed  by their supervisory  authorities  to
maintain  hidden  reserves.  The  Impact  of hidden  reserves  on bank  profitability  and
operating  ratios  depends  on whether  they are  used  to smooth  out fluctuations  in annual
profits or to build  up a hidden  source  of capital. In developing  countries,  the problem  is
usually  one of hidden  losses  rather  than of hidden  reserves.  Failure  to provide  adequately
for nonperforming  loans  and  to write off loan  losses  is a widespread  problem  among  banks
In developing  countries. In some  countries,  making  proper  allowance  for such  provisions
may  wipe out completely  not only the annual  profits of banks  but also  their entire  equity
capital. In some  countries,  nonperforming  loans  may  be severa!  times  reported  bank  equity
(World  Bank,  1990a.  p. 53).
In conclusion,  a main  argument  of this paper  is that comparinq  bank  performance
among  banks  from  different countries,  especially  across  developed  and developing
countries,  is fraught  with great  difficulties. Considerable  care  must  be taken  to allow for
differences  in product  mix, capital  structure,  accounting  conventions  and  especially
Inflation  rates  before  drawing  firm conclusions.  The  use of standardized  ratios  can be
helpful  In highlighting  unusual  patterns  but such  ratios cannot  substitute  for detailed
knowledge  and  understanding  of local conditions  and  practices.
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